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AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
—MAKING USE OF A MUDDY SUPREME 
COURT EXACTIONS CASE 
 
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER & MICHAEL O’LOUGHLIN** 
An unfortunate amount of semantic confusion currently 
burdens the constitutional process of balancing private 
property rights and governmental public welfare protections. 
The Fifth Amendment contains both a general requirement 
of “due process,” and a corollary protection against 
unconstitutional “taking” of property. These are two separate 
protections, not just one. More than a century after the 
Takings Clause was drafted, an enigmatic decision, 
Pennsylvania Coal, expanded the clause to say that 
government regulations could cause such a diminution of 
private property value that they could unconstitutionally 
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Joe’s death in 2014, I decided to revisit the conundrums involved in drawing lines 
between private property and public civic rights. Sadly, while this Article was in 
process, our dear colleague Marc Poirier died after a long, brave struggle with 
cancer. In his last year, he wrote a memo on Koontz that helped shape the 
arguments of this Article, and we dedicate our efforts here, for whatever they may 
be worth, to the memory of Marc and his years of work. For this Article, we also 
owe thanks to Joseph Belza, Sonja Marrett, and Nelson Nedlin, of the Boston 
College Law School’s Class of 2017, and the remarkably deft and gracious staff of 
the University of Colorado Law Review. 
** Boston College Law School, Juris Doctor Candidate 2018; Executive Articles 
Editor, Boston College Law Review. 
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take that property, even with no physical appropriation 
(which is how the Framers had understood the clause). 
Having launched the concept of regulatory takings, the Court 
barely revisited it for another fifty years, while extensively 
developing general due process doctrine. Then, starting in 
the 1970s, the Justices began to expand the application of 
regulatory takings doctrine. But they did little to clarify the 
distinction between takings and general due process 
scrutiny. Nor did they clarify the essentially subjective line 
drawing of the takings inquiry, instead freighting it with 
new complexities, political agendas, and internal 
contradictions. 
One particularly inapt result has emerged in the realm of 
land use regulatory exaction conditions, where a due process 
inquiry has been maladroitly commingled with takings test 
language. The Court began to distinguish the two in 2005, 
but left the resolution half-baked. Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Management District, in 2013, demonstrated the current 
semantic jumble, taking a basic due process exaction 
question and discussing it as a takings question. The 
semantics have resulted in unfortunate consequences. 
Building upon a factual and conceptual autopsy of 
the Koontz litigation, and noting a strategic semicolon from 
1789 in the Fifth Amendment, this Article proposes a 
number of semantic hygiene clarifications for reviews of 
exactions and other “unconstitutional conditions”—(1) that 
judicial review of a permit exaction’s validity typically first 
must address a takings question—could the permit have 
been simply denied without excessively diminishing private 
property value?—if not, no added conditions are justified, 
but if so, then the further question of the exaction conditions’ 
constitutionality presents a further, distinct, targeted test 
based in due process—the Nollan-Dolan test; (2) that further 
review under Nollan-Dolan, based in substantive due 
process, applies whenever a landowner challenges the logic 
of any government-required exaction, whether monetary or 
not; and (3) recognizing Nollan-Dolan review of exaction 
conditions as a matter of substantive due process, rather 
than regulatory takings, fundamentally narrows the remedy 
options, as well as very usefully clarifies other enduring 
mysteries of the constitutional balance between public and 
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private rights in property, a core issue of modern democratic 
governance. To serve these goals, this Article includes a 
suggested Semantic Lexicon of public/private property rights 
jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every so often, the muddled logic and semantics of long-
accreted legal concepts cause such puzzlement or dysfunction 
that courts are jarred into making necessary, fundamental 
clarifications; at other times, the call for fundamental review 
necessarily comes from the academy. This Article addresses 
such a situation where fundamental clarification is necessary. 
A notable confusion currently haunts a particular area of 
property rights law—when property owners challenge 
regulatory exactions as unconstitutional conditions, as in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 case Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District.1 Exactions jurisprudence presents 
yet another dimension to a fundamental question in democratic 
governance—to attempt to define the line between private 
property rights and regulatory protections of public welfare in 
a democracy is to explore the fragile balance between 
individual freedoms and a society’s collective imperatives. 
Exactions are conditions routinely attached to government 
permits when applicants seek permission to take actions that 
are a privilege rather than due-as-of-right—commonly a 
property owner’s request to amend, diminish, avoid, or expand 
existing regulatory specifications. Consider two standard 
examples: Under some zoning ordinances, a small professional 
commercial office may be allowed by special permit in a single-
family residential zone only if extra parking spaces are 
provided for the adjacent public. Or, under subdivision 
regulations, a developer may be permitted to record a 
subdivision deed or subdivision plat map only if an array of 
conditional requirements are certified, often including 
exactions for required sewerage and utilities, dedication of 
open space for the public, funding for necessitated public 
services like school or fire-response facilities, etc.2 
In such situations, courts and scholars alike often tend to 
confuse the semantics of the exactions inquiry, which has its 
 
 1. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013); see 
also Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, 
and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 416 (2014) 
(describing regulatory takings doctrine as a mess and Koontz as adding to the 
complexity of the doctrine). 
 2. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. Other similar exactions include 
development fees, conditional requirements for developers to get the benefit of 
local tax incentives, etc. 
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logical base in a due process rational basis review, with the 
very different concept of a regulatory takings excessive-burden 
review.3 Takings tests, at their canonic base, ask whether a 
regulated property owner has suffered an unconstitutionally 
excessive loss of property value. Review of government-exacted 
conditions, however, asks whether they make reasonable sense, 
a substantive due process inquiry—asking, in other words, 
whether there is a logical basis for the particular exaction 
condition in the particular circumstances being weighed. 
Unconstitutional regulatory takings and unconstitutional 
conditions thus are fundamentally different. When a court has 
weighed the validity of a regulatory requirement’s attached 
exaction conditions, analytically speaking it has applied two 
distinct judicial tests—not just one. First, the takings question 
asking whether the regulation’s impact on property value is an 
unconstitutionally excessive taking; and then, second, a 
specifically targeted substantive due process inquiry asking 
whether the exactions required for the conditional grant of 
permission are themselves constitutionally rational.4 Over the 
years, however, judicial opinions have often spliced these two 
quite different inquiries into an inapt hybrid—with questions 
of due process rationality being called takings inquiries—a 
merger that serves neither concept well and produces 
ambiguity, confusion, and dysfunctions in constitutional 
jurisprudence. The muddled vocabulary that pervades every 
level of the judiciary remains a core problem that we suggest 
the academy must at some point try to rectify if the courts 
cannot do so on their own. This is especially so given the 
contemporary context of virulent political “deconstruction” 
assaults against governmental regulations generally, which in 
 
 3. Note the language of the Fifth Amendment: “No person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; [and, in addition,] 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (emphasis added) (and note the significant semicolon, which 
appears in the original 1789 text of the Bill of Rights, Figure 3 infra after note 
79). These are two distinct mandates, although the latter, while separate and 
more specific, analytically sits within the preceding general due process 
requirements. The Fourteenth Amendment does not contain a Takings Clause. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Only incorporation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause through the Fourteenth’s Due Process Clause makes it applicable to the 
states—just one more element contributing to the conflation of the different lines 
drawn between private property rights and the needs of the public. Id. amends. V, 
XIV. 
 4. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 746 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
many cases use elaborations of private property rights concepts 
to attack environmental protection and other public-interest 
regulatory systems, international and domestic.5 
The Koontz case amply serves to demonstrate this need for 
“semantic hygiene” clarification.6 The extensively scrutinized 
Supreme Court opinions in Koontz, and the cascade of lower 
court opinions in the case before and after the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, provide a prime example of the semantic and 
functional confusion plaguing the intersection of private 
property rights and public governance. 
Koontz was a 2013 Supreme Court land use decision 
coming from Florida that scrutinized the common practice of 
attaching mitigating offsets, exactions, or other forms of 
specific or general conditions to the permitting processes 
through which government agencies negotiate and approve or 
deny private development requests.7 Back in 1994 Mr. Koontz 
 
 5. Private property resistance to government regulation using the “invalid 
regulatory takings” rubric has grown in the politics and jurisprudence of the U.S. 
over past decades. Internationally, too: the regulatory takings debate has 
relatively recently intruded into the international sphere through previously 
unprecedented use of “expropriation” provisions in international trade agreements 
to require nation signatories to pay compensation to corporations that face profit-
reducing regulations. In a famous arbitral case under NAFTA, for example, 
Mexico was forced to pay compensation to a U.S. corporation for preventing it 
from constructing a facility that posed toxic chemical contamination risks, under a 
novel expansion of international physical “expropriation” law to extend its 
compensation principle to “indirect expropriations.” Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (NAFTA Aug. 30, 2000); see also Gerard Greenfield, 
Metalclad v. Mexico, Toxic Waste and NAFTA, 90 AGAINST THE CURRENT 
(Solidarity), Jan.–Apr. 2001, https://www.solidarity-us.org/node/977 
[https://perma.cc/H8KQ-9TY4]: 
[T]he NAFTA Tribunal for the case of Metalclad Corp vs. Mexico ruled in 
favor of Metalclad, ordering the Mexican government to pay US $16.7 
million in compensation . . . . In 1997 the U.S. chemicals giant, Ethyl 
Corp, used NAFTA’s Chapter 11 to sue the Canadian government for a 
ban imposed on MMT, a gasoline additive produced by Ethyl which is 
toxic and hazardous to public health. Ethyl claimed that the ban 
“expropriated” its assets in Canada . . . . Ethyl sued the Canadian 
government for US$250 million. A year later, in June 1998, the 
Canadian government withdrew environmental legislation banning 
MMT, and paid Ethyl Corp US$13 million to settle the case. Three more 
suits are outstanding against the Canadian government, three against 
the Mexican government and two against the U.S. government . . . . 
 6. We believe the legal profession has long needed an explicit phrase for the 
conceptual and terminological clarification process so necessary in many areas of 
muddled jurisprudential terms, and we are only too pleased to provide it: 
“semantic hygiene.” Let there be light . . . . 
 7. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013). 
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had applied for a permit to fill and develop wetlands on his 
property.8 Instead of simply denying the request, the state 
environmental agency suggested that it would approve the 
permit if Mr. Koontz would grant, or pay for, any of a number 
of offsetting exactions to mitigate the loss of wetland acreage.9 
Mr. Koontz, however, refused to consider any of the suggested 
offsets, so the agency denied the permit and Mr. Koontz sued, 
alleging a violation of his constitutional property rights.10 The 
ensuing judicial treatment lingering over almost two decades 
fundamentally muddled what that alleged exactions violation 
should have been called, how it should have been tested, and 
what remedies were properly available.11 
In Koontz, the lower state courts had consistently 
addressed the matter in light of the then-recent decision in 
Dolan v. Tigard, along with the exaction review criteria 
introduced several years earlier in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission.12 The Nollan-Dolan framework has become the 
standard test of exaction conditions. It directs courts to ask 
whether required conditions (1) have an “essential nexus,” a 
causative rational nexus, with the permitting programs’ 
objectives, and (2) are “roughly proportional” to the potential 
impact of the proposed projects.13 
Unfortunately, the Nollan and Dolan opinions also 
incorporated incidental language from a prior case, Agins v. 
Tiburon,14 that spliced due process rational nexus language 
into its regulatory takings discussion. The Koontz trial court 
accordingly labeled its exactions analysis as a takings test, and 
found that the conditions proffered to Mr. Koontz effected an 
invalid “taking.”15 Subsequent appellate review centered on 
whether this exaction situation did or did not call for 
 
 8. Id. at 2592. 
 9. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1224 (Fla. 
2011), rev’d, 570 U.S. 595 (2013). 
 10. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI 94-5773, 1997 WL 
34854535, at *8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 1997) (order granting motion to dismiss). 
 11. See discussion infra Part I. 
 12. Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-
5673, 2002 WL 34724740, at *4–8 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Oct. 30, 2002). 
 13. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 14. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262–63 (1980), with dicta subsequently 
rejected in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), infra notes 17, 111–
116, and accompanying text. 
 15. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *8. 
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application of the Nollan-Dolan test. It glossed over the far 
more fundamental question, however, of whether the rational 
nexus test for exactions actually is separate from regulatory 
takings inquiries (that traditionally turn upon the extent of 
diminution of property value, now usually assessed under the 
framework outlined in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City 
of New York16). 
Midway through the parade of Koontz appellate 
appearances, however, in 2005, another Supreme Court case, 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., made a fundamental distinction 
between due process tests and regulatory takings. Lingle 
expressly rejected the Agins decision’s mix-up of due process 
rational nexus language with takings language, a mix-up that 
the Nollan and Dolan decisions had incorporated.17 When 
deciding Koontz, however, both the majority and the dissenters 
in the Supreme Court failed to maintain that prior course of 
semantic hygiene in Lingle, continuing to conflate the two 
dissimilar judicial tests when they discussed the application of 
Nollan-Dolan to exactions. 
In Koontz, Justice Alito issued a deceptively simple 
holding: “We hold that the government’s demand for property 
from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the 
requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government 
denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.”18 
That summation does not strike us as surprising or 
inappropriate (although one eminent commentator has 
attacked the Koontz majority’s decision to apply the Nollan-
Dolan test to land-use exactions as “The Very Worst Land Use 
Decision Ever!”).19 The far greater confusion emerging from the 
 
 16. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 
2011); along with Pennsylvania Coal, the three-part rubric of the Penn Central 
decision has become the equally canonic regulatory takings citation, emphasizing 
diminution: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978). 
 17. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540, 542 (rejecting the Agins dictum that a takings test 
also included a test of whether the tested regulation “substantially advances” the 
public purpose). 
 18. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 619 (2013). 
 19. John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2014); see also John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 
39 VT. L. REV. 573, 574 (2015). As we see it, the application of a Nollan-Dolan 
rational nexus element to monetary as well as physical or title exactions is neither 
novel nor oppressive upon normal land use regulatory practices. Development fees 
are a familiar and frequent municipal requirement; subdivision regulation 
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various judicial opinions in Koontz, in the Supreme Court and 
in the Florida courts before and after, arises in the text beyond 
the simple words of the Court’s majority holding—in the 
promiscuous manner in which the Koontz courts systematically 
conflated the Nollan-Dolan rational nexus inquiry with the 
rubric of regulatory taking. 
In the private vs. public rights realm, the Koontz case 
offers a rich lode of fact and confusion for scholars, judges, and 
practitioners to mine. This Article ultimately uses the 
landscape and legal process of the case to help resolve the 
muddied jurisprudential waters, by analyzing the mismatched 
regulatory takings/unconstitutional conditions inquiries. Part I 
of this Article presents the facts, administrative, and judicial 
history of Koontz in more detail.20 Part II proposes a course of 
semantic hygiene emerging from a scrutiny of pertinent case 
law, including a clarified lexicon of property rights judicial 
review terminology.21 Part III, finally, offers three propositions 
regarding judicial review of regulatory exactions that 
subsequently emerge from this analysis, including a 
fundamental clarification of remedy issues.22 Hopefully, these 
propositions may clear the jurisprudential fog shrouding 
exactions, takings, and due process, and help resolve the 
private rights-public welfare puzzles it harbored. 
I. THE FACTS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL 
HISTORY, OF KOONTZ 
A. Facts and Administrative History 
Mr. Coy Koontz owned a parcel of land of approximately 
14.2 acres adjoining a state highway service road east of 
Orlando, Florida,23 the majority of which had been classified as 
 
exactions often involve monetary fees to counter-balance burdens placed upon 
local government services, etc.; and judicial review of such conditions, though 
rarely explicitly Nollan-Dolan review, is not regarded as unusual or as strict 
scrutiny. 
 20. See discussion infra Part I. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II, and Lexicon beginning at page 782. 
 22. See discussion infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Figure 1 (depicting Latitude 28°33’52.28” North / Longitude 
81°11’16.37” West). Viewed at an aerial image “eye altitude” of 15 miles, the 
parcel’s location East of Orlando appears juxtaposed with extensive suburban 
development, the adjacent highway interchange, and the various forested wetland 
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statutory wetlands.24 The case focused on the developable 3.7-
acre northern portion of the property situated between the road 
and a high-tension powerline easement.25 Mr. Koontz wanted 
to fill in this portion of his property to make it more 
marketable or to build a strip mall himself.26 
Because most of the Koontz property, including 3.4 acres of 
the northern property, was classified as statutory wetlands, he 
needed regulatory approval from the St. Johns River Water 
Management District (“the agency”).27 Mr. Koontz applied for a 
 
extensions of the St. Johns River watershed. The parcel is tributary to the 
Econlockhatchee River, which in turn flows northward into the St. Johns River. 
When Mr. Koontz purchased the property in 1972, it comprised a bit less than 15 
acres, but in 1987 the state highway department, to build a frontage service road, 
took under a half acre from the northern section, which left the 3.7 acres proposed 
for development with excellent road-frontage and highway access (the dead-end of 
the service road is now home to a large auto dealership complex). The 3.7-acre 
section can be clearly seen online at an “eye altitude” of 800 feet. See infra Figure 
1 (noting the area sought to be developed with a smaller, upper, rectangular box). 
 24. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2002 WL 
34724740, at *2–3 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Oct. 30, 2002). Figure 1 designates the 
approximate non-wetland areas with diagonal lines. Approximately 1.4 acres in 
the entire property were non-wetland uplands, mostly in the southerly, 
undevelopable area. A 0.3-acre segment of this was located along the service road 
within the 3.7 acre proposed project area. The dimensions of the parcel and 
portions were described inconsistently through the litigation. The trial court 
opinion presents the most accurate description of the dimensions so those are 
used in this Article. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *2–3. A significant 
recalculation of the wetlands designation—based on the effects of prior 
canalization—raised questions about classification of the land as wetland but was 
not part of the Supreme Court proceedings. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 25. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *2–3; see Figure 1 (noting the 3.7-acre area 
sought to be developed). 
 26. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *2–3. 
 27. Id. The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.013–
373.813 (West 2018), created a variety of Florida water management districts, 
including the St. Johns River Water Management District, § 373.069(1)(c), and 
authorized it to “require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as 
are necessary to assure that the construction or alteration . . . will not be harmful 
to the water resources of the district.” FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.069, 373.413. 
Initially, a project like Koontz’s would require two permits: a Management and 
Storage of Surface Waters permit (MSSW) for “filling in, excavating in, or 
drainage of a wetland” pursuant to FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-4.04(1), 2(b) 10 
(1994), and a Wetland Resource Management permit (WRP) for “dredging and 
filling conducted in, on, or over . . . surface waters of the state.” (FLA. ADMIN. 
CODE ANN. r. 17.312.030(1) (1994)). State law changed in 1993 to allow a single 
Environmental Resource Permit to stand in place of these two permits, but the 
corresponding regulations did not take effect until 1995. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
373.4131 (West 2018); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-330.010 (2013); Respondent’s 
Brief at 7 n.4, Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013) 
(No. 11-1447). Consequently, when Koontz sought permission to fill his lands in 
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permit to fill the northern 3.4-acre wetland area and offered to 
give a conservation easement permanently restricting 
development on the remaining roughly eleven acres of wetlands 




Figure 1. The Koontz Site (solid rectangle lines), with designated 
upland area (lower dotted line), one-acre fill + existing upland 
developable area (upper dotted line, schematic), small westerly 
drainage ditch (dashed vertical), and a high-tension power-line 
easement (the horizontal double-line). 
Complementing its aims of conserving water resources, the 
agency had a policy of trying to promote appropriately feasible 
agricultural, industrial, and residential development through 
its permitting program.29 The agency’s staff therefore entered 
into informal negotiations with Mr. Koontz, suggesting a 
 
1994, he still needed two permits. Respondent’s Brief, supra at 7 n.4. Due to the 
similarity between the permits and permitting process, however, the state agency 
treated them as a single permit application throughout litigation for simplicity’s 
sake. Id. This Article will continue as such. 
 28. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *3. 
 29. Policy and Purpose, FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-4.011 (3) (1983) 
(repealed 2012). 
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variety of alternatives that would accommodate an ecologically 
acceptable measure of development for the property while 
maintaining the watershed protection objectives of the state 
wetlands act.30 
Given the large proportion of wetlands within the subject 
parcel, the staff indicated that the district would not approve a 
permit to fill 3.4 acres of statutory wetlands with only an 
eleven-acre offset.31 Their standard rule of thumb for ecological 
mitigation of wetland losses called for a conservation easement 
of roughly ten acres for every one acre filled.32 
In the course of permit discussions, the water district staff 
suggested five acceptable development options, two of which 
involved potential on-site offsetting mitigation, one open-
invitation option, and two options for off-site offsetting 
mitigation. Mr. Koontz’s legal attacks exclusively criticized the 
two off-site suggestions, ultimately making them the focus of 
each of the semantically confused judicial opinions that 
followed in the case, all of which uniformly ignored the 
potential relevance of the other suggested options.33 
 Option 1 (on-site): Mr. Koontz did not need a permit at all if 
he chose to develop the non-wetland 13,000 square feet of his 
parcel that lay along the highway spur, a part of his property 
that had never been designated as statutory wetlands.34 This 
unregulated stretch of highway frontage potentially had a 
setting sufficient to generate substantial economic return for 
his property—in constitutional takings parlance a “reasonable 
remaining economic use” in spite of the wetlands regulation.35
 
 30. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Petitioner’s Brief at 2, St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 
So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC09-713). 
 33. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 602–
03 (2013). 
 34. See Figure 1 (referencing the line at top right of the parcel). 
 35. The baseline denominator in a judicial takings review of this option would 
be the parcel-as-a-whole, the more than fourteen acres that Mr. Koontz purchased 
(in 1972, for less than $100,000—see Proposed Final Judgment for the Defendant 
at 39-39, No. Cl-94-5673 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Oct. 30, 2002)) upon which he based his 
investment-backed expectations. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). He received in excess of $400,000 in the 
1980s for condemnation of less than an acre of this land (see Proposed Final 
Judgment  for the Defendant, supra). In the 1990s he sought to develop more of 
this property, sparking the at-issue litigation. The only estimation of property 
value that appears in the litigation record comes from the intermediate Florida 
appellate court’s 2006 calculation of damages—$477,000 for the entire 3.7-acre 
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 Option 2 (on-site): As a second option, the district would 
grant a permit for development of one acre of property along 
the highway if Mr. Koontz set aside the remaining acres of his 
land as an offsetting conservation easement.36 This acre—
43,500-plus square feet of commercially developable highway 
frontage land—arguably would have given Mr. Koontz an even 
greater, and constitutionally sufficient, economic return on the 
private investment, validating the regulatory action.37 
Analytically, the existence of these two on-site options 
could clarify the fundamental distinction between the 
constitutional inquiries for takings and for exactions.38 
 
area, as valued with all regulations removed. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 6912444, at *1–2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006). A current real estate 
appraisal for one developable acre in that location (one-acre development being 
one of the options suggested by the regulatory agency) is approximately $170,660. 
Telephone interview with Rick Singh, CFA, Orange County Florida Real Estate 
Appraiser, Office of Rick Singh CFA (Dec. 4, 2017). Taken together, these figures 
suggest that Mr. Koontz would still have had a substantial overall profit available 
had he accepted the proffered one-acre development option, particularly in light of 
his modest initial investment. A less-accessible neighboring site on the same 
service road has also been beneficially developed with extensive commercial use 
for a large auto dealership. See Figure 1. The family ultimately sold the entire 
property in 2007 for $1.2 million. Personal Representative Deed, Coy Koontz, Jr. 
to Floridel LLC, June 14, 2007; Property Summary, 12800 E Colonial Drive, 
Orange County Property Appraiser, http://www.ocpafl.org/PRC/3122230000000 
46.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXN5-T9Y5]; see, e.g., Rick Singh CFA Orange County 
Property Appraiser Florida, Map Search-12800 E Colonial Dr, https://maps.ocpafl. 
org/webmapjs/# [https://perma.cc/NK8J-ECQR].  
 36. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 602. This one-acre option apparently would have 
been made up by adding additional fill alongside the 0.3-acre of non-wetland 
highway frontage. The Court noted that this option would have required draining 
and leveling portions of the land. (The majority opinion said that the resulting 
conservation easement offset would incorporate 13.9 acres; for what it’s worth—
not much—the residuum would more precisely have been 13.2 acres minus 1.14 
acre of powerline easement—12 acres—slightly more than the agency’s preferred 
10:01 ratio offset preference.). 
 37. In Palazzolo, the existence of one buildable lot out of the desired seventy-
four was enough to avoid the Lucas “categorical” rule, and the qualities of the 
wetlands potentially affected supported a finding of no taking. Palazzolo v. State, 
No. WM 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108, at *58 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005); 
Patrick A. Parenteau, Unreasonable Expectations: Why Palazzolo Has No Right to 
Turn a Silk Purse into a Sow’s Ear, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 101 (2002). 
 38. A court might have fully resolved the case if it found that either of those 
proposed resolutions would have satisfied the constitutional requirements under 
the terms of the property value diminution test from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). If the diminution were found to be non-excessive 
in the relative context, and hence constitutional, the conservation easement in 
this option would probably have been found to be valid under the Nollan-Dolan 
due process terms. 
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Presuming that plain enforcement of the permitting 
regulations would not effect a taking, the proposed on-site 
exaction would have been a separate, hardly controversial, 
unconstitutional conditions inquiry. 
 Option 3 (open-invitation): Third, the water district staff 
invited Mr. Koontz to suggest a mitigation action proposal of 
his own choosing, building upon any suggestions from his 
hydrology expert that would proportionately offset the loss of 
wetland hydrological and ecological storage on the subject 




Figure 2.  Satellite graphic showing the Koontz site (double ring), 
the sinuous Econlockhatchee watershed, and the alternative A & B 
offsite mitigation proposals. “A” represents the proposed drainage 
ditch corrections at the Little Big Econlockhatchee State Forest. 
“B” represents the proposed culvert repair at the Hal Scott 
Regional Preserve. 
And finally, the agency proffered two potential off-site 
 
 39. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 602. 
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alternatives—and it was these that were virtually the exclusive 
focus of every judicial analysis in the case.40 If Mr. Koontz 
chose either one of the off-site options, the agency said, he 
could fill the entire 3.7-acre portion of his land between the 
powerline and the highway, as he had wished and requested.41 
 Option 4 (off-site): One of the proffered off-site mitigation 
options asked that, in addition to the offered eleven-acre 
conservation easement, he pay for the repair of some crushed 
culverts at the Hal Scott Preserve, four-and-a-half miles away 
from the Koontz property in the Econlockhatchee drainage.42 
 Option 5 (off-site): An alternative suggested off-site 
mitigation option was that, in addition to the offered eleven-
acre conservation, he could fill in some drainage ditches to 
restore natural wetland storage function at the Little Big 
Econlockhatchee State Forest, approximately seven miles away 
in the Econlockhatchee drainage.43 
Although the cases do not note the hydrological connection, 
an aerial view of the Koontz parcel’s geographic location and 
the two proposed off-site mitigation options clearly shows their 
tributary relationship within the unitary Econlockhatchee 
watershed.44 
Each of the off-site improvements would have restored 
natural wetland water flows for marshy terrain estimated at 
approximately fifty acres.45 The acreage benefited by either of 
the two off-site options, plus the conservation easement, would 
total sixty-one acres, safely in excess of the ten-to-one rule of 
thumb ratio for offsetting 3.4 acres of wetlands fill. The agency 
staff presented evidence, on the other hand, that cleaning out 
the clogged ditches or repairing the subject culverts would cost 
as little as $10,000, in contrast to the substantially increased 
value of the filled acreage.46 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id.; supra Figure 2 at A. 
 42. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 602; supra Figure 2 at B. 
 43. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 602; supra Figure 2 at A. 
 44. See supra Figure 2. 
 45. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 602. 
 46. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2002 WL 
34724740, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002). This raises the fascinating question of what 
Nollan-Dolan “proportionality” means; as a matter of due process fairness, does it 
consider the constitutional balancing fairness in terms of proportionality of 
acreage, or parity of economic burden, or some other quantum comparison? If 
causality is the basis of the proportionality analysis, then acreage would seem to 
be the most appropriate consideration. Ironically, if the regulatory takings rubric 
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The way we read the Koontz facts, therefore, is that under 
the Florida agency’s permit process Mr. Koontz received a five-
way choice. If he had chosen any of the four agency-proposed 
options, or had proposed an acceptable invited alternative, he 
apparently could have proceeded on those terms. But, Mr. 
Koontz chose not to adopt any of the five. As a result, the 
permit application did not meet a necessary standard for an 
exception to the wetlands rules, and the agency voted to deny 
the permit.47 
Irritated with the regulatory process’s imposition on his 
plans, Mr. Koontz hired an attorney known for property rights 
opposition to government regulation, and he challenged its 
constitutionality.48 He later found support from the powerfully 
financed and backed Pacific Legal Foundation, one of the 
industry-sponsored “public interest law firms” that in the past 
several decades have mounted private property challenges to a 
wide range of government regulations.49 
B. Anomalies 
Three less-than-obvious factual complexities potentially 
cloud the legal analysis of the Koontz case as precedent. First, 
the litigation centered on the constitutional validity of the 
suggested off-site exactions—reviewing whether they were 
unconstitutional conditions—but the agency had never 
required any specific exaction, and as noted, one or more of the 
options may well have been constitutionally valid.50 Arguably, 
 
were applied to the exaction inquiry, the focus would more appropriately be upon 
the comparative individual burdens to the property owners. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Telephone Interview with St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., Office of 
Gen. Counsel (Aug. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Aug. 26 Telephone Interview]. 
 49. See Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Koontz, 570 U.S. 595 (2013) (Pacific Legal Foundation filing on 
behalf of petitioner); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 
1220, 1221 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC09-713). There has long been a consistent, 
powerfully organized resistance to governmental constraints upon private—
especially corporate—property, and the fossil fuel and other extractive industries, 
following the lead of the 1972 Powell Memorandum, created a series of well-
resourced resistance to government regulation. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity 
for All, 93 YALE L. J. 1415, 1419 (1984); Lewis Powell, Confidential Memorandum-
Attack on American Free Enterprise System, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1972). 
 50. See supra notes 33–46 and accompanying text. Whatever the broader 
scope of the concept of “unconstitutional conditions” might be, it seems clear that 
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finding the permitting process unconstitutional should have 
required a judicial holding that no agency-proffered option was 
constitutional—i.e., that all five suggested options were 
constitutionally invalid. 
A second anomaly: Mr. Koontz applied for his permit—and 
the Supreme Court decided the case—on the premise that all 
but 0.3 acres of the project area were statutory wetlands under 
the state’s Clean Water Act authority and under the state’s 
watershed management laws.51 Koontz, however, had 
introduced a consultant’s study as evidence in the 2002 trial 
that argued that a ditch dug in the 1980s along the parcel’s 
border had artificially lowered the adjoining water table, 
making much of the parcel no longer definable as wetland.52 
Ultimately, following a subsequent trial court judgment, the 
agency accepted the updated hydrology data and closed the file 
in 2006, giving Koontz a permit to develop his parcel as he had 
wished and requiring only the 11-acre conservation easement 
originally offered.53 In effect, all the litigation that thereafter 
persisted—contesting whether Nollan-Dolan was the 
appropriate test for such off-site monetary exactions—ignored 
the mistaken data issue (which would have raised the 
fundamental due process question of whether a regulation is 
rational when it is based on fundamentally false evidence) and 
instead focused on determining whether the permitting process 
had effected a temporary taking—presuming that exactions 
were a takings issue.54 
This raises the third anomaly: throughout the Koontz 
litigation, it was never clear for what harm he sought 
compensation. No court found that he had suffered a 
diminution in property value, and he ultimately received a 
 
judicial testing of the constitutional validity of conditional exactions under the 
Nollan-Dolan rule seeks a determination whether they are, or are not, 
“unconstitutional conditions.” 
 51. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 600–01; Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 32, at 5 n.4. 
The Court also stated that he owned 14.9 acres. 13.9 acres of which it said were 
wetlands. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 601–02. Actually, at the time of the permit 
application, Koontz only owned 14.2 acres, 12.8 acres of which the parties believed 
to be wetlands. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *3. 
 52. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 32, at 5. See Figure 1, vertical dashed line. 
 53. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2003 WL 6072846, at *2 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2004) (ordering grant of the permit); Affidavit of William C. Fogle, 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 6931531 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
2006) (saying the permit was finally granted in December of 2005). 
 54. Koontz, 77 So. 3d at 1225. 
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permit to develop as he wished. The Florida courts assigning 
compensation apparently did so based on a ten-year 
“temporary takings” loss of property value that the mistaken 
hydrology had effected through the protracted permitting 
process, plus interest for the delay.55 But the judicial opinions 
considering the constitutionality of the permitting process did 
not discuss the factual hydrological mistake. They only 
discussed the permitting negotiations that took place. It seems 
that the courts ordered compensation because they determined 
that the agency’s suggested off-site conditions failed the 
Nollan-Dolan due process test, but assessed compensation 
based on a deprivation not actually caused by the proffering of 
those conditions—but rather caused by the temporary 
deprivation of property use stemming from the mistaken 
hydrology facts and Mr. Koontz’s refusal to consider any of the 
five development options. Although Mr. Koontz possibly could 
have framed a suit for damages under § 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act against the individual responsible for the mistake 
who thus caused the deprivation, he never pursued that 
course.56 
These three anomalies mean that the majority and 
dissenting Supreme Court opinions in Koontz both proceeded 
upon an understanding of the case’s facts that was in reality 
quite flawed. Taking the Court’s opinions in Koontz and 
analyzing them on the facts as the Justices thought them to be, 
however, nevertheless allows an analysis of the opinions’ legal 
logic and implications that is usefully revealing and instructive 
for the future. 
C. The Koontz Case in the Courts 
From the beginning, the Koontz litigation quickly moved 
 
 55. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 6912444, at *1–2 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 allows parties to sue state officials 
in their individual capacity for damages for constitutional violations. Section 1983 
itself does not require any particular mental state, but bringing a due process 
clause § 1983 claim generally requires showing more than mere negligence. 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). The required showings—that the 
person acted in their individual capacity under color of state law, caused a 
deprivation, and with liability greater than mere negligence—would have limited 
Mr. Koontz’s ability to succeed on such a suit. See remedies discussion infra notes 
213–236 and accompanying text. 
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beyond the facts to arguments about the appropriate analysis 
for reviewing the type of exactions at play. Mr. Koontz, 
focusing on the options that would allow him to fill 3.4 acres, 
objected to both of the off-site mitigation options and filed suit 
claiming that the proposed conditions effected a taking.57 
In his original complaint to the circuit court in 1997, in 
fact, Koontz’s counsel challenged the water district’s permit 
denial process on two separate claims: that it was an 
unconstitutional regulatory taking and also an 
unconstitutional violation of his client’s due process private 
property rights.58 But at trial and thereafter, the parties only 
litigated the case as a “regulatory takings” claim.59 On the 
facts, the trial court in 2002 held—in a single sentence—that 
there had been an unconstitutional regulatory “taking” because 
the off-site exactions lacked a sufficient Nollan-Dolan causative 
nexus and proportionality showing.60 It was while awaiting 
appeal of that takings determination that the agency reviewed 
and accepted the corrected hydrology data, developed a new 
permit proposal based on those new facts, and, pursuant to 
subsequent court order, issued a permit. A later trial court in 
2006 awarded $376,154 in damages to Koontz, calling it a 
temporary “taking.”61 
But the 1998 trial court that held the agency actions to be 
an invalid “taking” had not based its determination on a 
finding of excessive economic burden or diminution of property 
value, the classic regulatory takings inquiry.62 Instead, the 
judge based his finding of unconstitutionality upon on a failure 
of Nollan-Dolan nexus-proportionality in the proposed off-site 
mitigation conditions.63 The judicial rubric was regulatory 
 
 57. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 720 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 58. Aug. 26 Telephone Interview, supra note 48. 
 59. See Koontz, 720 So. 2d at 561. 
 60. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2002 WL 34724740, at *8 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002). 
 61. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2006 WL 6912444, at *1–2 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006). A Florida statute requires an award of damages, attorney’s 
fees, and costs for any takings judgment. FLA. STAT. § 373.617 (2017). 
 62. Koontz, 2002 WL 34724740, at *8. 
 63. Id. at *9–10. 
There was neither a showing of a nexus between the required off-site 
mitigation and the requested development of the tract, nor was there a 
showing of rough proportionality to the impact of site development. 
Under this legal approval, the St. Johns District’s required conditions of 
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takings, but the finding of the exactions’ unconstitutionality 
was actually based upon due process nexus rationality. 
On appeal of the takings issue in 2009, the Florida District 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judgment, applying 
the same semantics—“under the exactions theory of takings 
jurisprudence, it may not attach arbitrary conditions to 
issuance of a permit.”64 
When the case came to the Florida Supreme Court, the 
state high court just attempted to side-step scrutiny of the 
exactions, holding that the Nollan-Dolan test was inapplicable 
to the off-site conditions because they were monetary (a 
dubious distinction).65 That court too, however, continued to 
refer to the exactions question as a “takings” issue.66 
Note the timing: When the trial court’s basic findings were 
made in 1998, applying the exactions test from Nollan and 
Dolan that conflated regulatory takings and due process, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had not yet asserted that the two concepts 
were separate. That didn’t happen until 2005 in the Lingle 
case. Ignoring Lingle, however, the 2006, 2009, and 2012 
Florida court cases continued to interpret the Nollan-Dolan 
test as a “takings” test. 
The conflation continued in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Justice Alito wrote the opinion for a five-Justice majority, 
reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding the 
applicability of Nollan-Dolan, and holding that the test applies 
to monetary exactions as it does to physical exactions.67 The 
majority clearly did not like the sound of the agency’s proposed 
off-site conditional permit options and remanded the case to 
the state courts for a rather unclearly defined “further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”68 In effect, the 
majority opinion said “there might be a constitutional violation; 
we’ll let the remand see, applying Nollan-Dolan to the 
 
an unspecified but substantial off-site mitigation resulted in a regulatory 
taking. 
Id. 
 64. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 65. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 
2011); see infra text accompanying note 74. 
 66. Koontz, 77 So. 3d  at 1222–23, 1230. 
 67. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 619 (2013). 
 68. Id. 
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proposed exactions.”69 Throughout the opinion, however, 
focusing on the proposed off-site exaction options under Nollan-
Dolan, Justice Alito repeatedly referred to this 
unconstitutional conditions inquiry as a “takings” issue.70 
Both the majority and the dissent continued to confound 
the distinction between takings and exactions. Justice Kagan’s 
opinion for the usual four dissenters remarkably agreed with 
some of the Alito premises but thought Nollan-Dolan 
inapplicable on these particular facts.71 Justice Kagan echoed 
the Alito majority opinion that Nollan-Dolan was a “takings” 
inquiry but disagreed that the test applied to monetary 
exactions.72 In her view, only exactions that would lead to the 
appropriation of real or private property invoked Nollan-
Dolan.73 
Throughout their focus on the applicability of Nollan-
Dolan to monetary exactions, moreover, neither the majority 
nor the dissenters gave any thought to the question of the 
appropriate remedy.74 On remand, the Florida Supreme Court 
opted to return the case to the district court, which simply 
reaffirmed its prior holding of an unconstitutional “taking,” 
upholding the original 1998 trial court decision and a 
temporary takings remedy under a state takings remedy 
statute.75 
The Koontz majority decision and dissent have inspired 
mixed emotions by commentators, some responding with mild 
satisfaction and others with dismay and aversion.76 But 
virtually all find themselves enmeshed in the basic semantic 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 607–10, 614–15. 
 71. Id. at 619–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 619–21. 
 73. See id. at 621–22. While Justice Kagan’s view of the Takings Clause 
seems to accord better with its original meaning, understanding Nollan-Dolan as 
a form of rationality due process review rather than a takings issue puts her 
rejection of Nollan-Dolan’s relevance to monetary exactions out of step with long-
established land use law. Monetary impact fees, which municipalities routinely 
use, regularly survive rationality review analogous to Nollan-Dolan analysis in 
modern land use practice. See infra text accompanying note 202. 
 74. See id. at 614, 619; id. at 621 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 75. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (reasserting the judgment the Florida Supreme Court had earlier 
overturned, affirming the trial court’s choice to use Nollan-Dolan inquiry, 
accepting its application thereof as a “taking,” and applying FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 373.617(3) (West 2016)); see infra text accompanying note 226. 
 76. See, e.g., Echeverria articles discussed supra note 19. 
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tangles of the Justices’ reasoning. Analytically viewed, we 
would characterize the Koontz case as presenting two separate 
constitutional property rights issues. First, it presents a 
regulatory takings issue scrutinizing whether the state 
agency’s permit denial “went too far” as an excessive 
diminution of Mr. Koontz’s property value; and second, 
whether any of the agency’s rejected offset-exaction suggestions 
sufficiently related in nexus or proportionality to the potential 
harms of development to satisfy due process. The fundamental 
mistake that sorely requires corrective clarification, we assert, 
is to treat these two very different Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment inquiries as the same. 
II. SOME SEMANTIC BACKGROUND FOR TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
Some background on the evolution of takings review and 
the advent of unconstitutional conditions exaction cases is 
useful given the turgid vocabulary and doctrinal overlaps that 
often occur in property rights litigation. To address that 
vocabulary specifically, a compilation of proposed clarifications, 
presented as a “semantic lexicon” of relevant terms and 
concepts, follows below.77 
A. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The Fifth Amendment demonstrates the shifting mindsets 
of those leading the nation in the decade following the 
Revolution and their increased concern for individual liberties, 
property rights, and mistrust of legislatures.78 The two clauses 
operative in the land use realm—the Due Process Clause, in 
both its procedural and substantive forms, and the Takings 
Clause—serve this end by providing individuals a means to 
protect themselves against the caprice or despotism of 
government. But as we argue, the takings clause’s particular 
protection is a separate consideration from the rest of the 
general due process protections, and the distinction dictates 
the analysis applicable in any particular case. 
 
 77. See discussion infra Section II.D. 
 78. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 704–05 
(1985). 
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Note that James Madison, the author of the Fifth 
Amendment, separated the two clauses with a semicolon, not 
just a comma, reflecting a practical distinction between the 
specific and the general: 
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law**;** nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.79 
 
Figure 3. Excerpt from original parchment copy of the 1789 Bill of 
Rights, of what became the Fifth Amendment, highlighting the 
strategic semicolon between the general Due Process Clause and 
the Takings Clause.80 
 
 79.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 80. America’s Founding Documents, High Resolution Downloads, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/downloads (last visited Jan. 
31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6KP9-XQFR]. The National Archive’s transcription of 
the original copy of the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights reads as follows: 
Article the seventh . . . No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
America’s Founding Documents, The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8LR9-64QX]. 
Note that the original numbering of the amendment was as the “Seventh” 
because the first two original amendments—on allocation and compensation of 
members of the House of Representatives—were not concerned with citizens’ 
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To Madison, property rights were a creation of positive law 
rather than natural law, but their role in conflicts between 
men, and in facilitating tyranny, meant that they needed 
protection.81 Nevertheless, Madison saw the protections of the 
takings clause as narrow, applying only to the federal 
government and only to physical appropriations.82 His 
contemporaries viewed the takings clause the same way, and 
the state constitutions that had inspired it had conveyed the 
same concrete but limited protections.83 All other protections 
applied more generally, under due process. 
Since the early nineteenth century, the Due Process 
Clause has not only provided procedural protections, limiting 
how the government can proceed, but also substantive 
protections, limiting what the government can do.84 The track 
 
rights, and thus were removed from initial placement in the Bill of Rights. 
 81. Treanor, supra note 78, at 710; see FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & 
JOHN BANTA, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973). For more than seven centuries, from the Magna 
Carta to 1922, the Anglo-American legal system had understood a “taking” to 
require compensation only when the government physically took the land. Mere 
regulation was never a compensable taking; in 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Justice Holmes invented an ahistorical, 
unprecedented interpretation of the word “take” never dreamed of by the Framers 
of the Constitution. See infra note 98. Justice Scalia (and Justice Thomas) have 
been longtime asserters of whatever they consider to have been the Framers’ 
original intent, seeking to delimit constitutional doctrines to their eighteenth 
century terms. But it is quite clear that the Framers had no thought that 
regulations could ever be unconstitutional takings. See the history in MELTZ, 
BOSSELMAN, MERRIAM & FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1995 ed.). But, 
situationally inconsistent with principle, both Scalia and Thomas have expressed 
devotion to the application of the Takings prohibition of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments against governmental regulations, irrespective of the Framers’ 
intent. Professor Jeremy Firestone has noted Justice Scalia’s unapologetic 
political pragmatism on this point of originalist principle:  
. . . I once had occasion to ask former Justice Scalia how he squared his 
regulatory taking jurisprudence with originalism, and his response was 
that regulatory takings jurisprudence had been with us for a long time 
and so he took it from there. 
Posting of Jeremy Firestone, jf@udel.edu, to Envtl. Law Professor Listserv, 
envlawprofessors@lists.uoregon.edu (June 23, 2017) (on file with author). 
 82. Treanor, supra note 78, at 708. 
 83. Id. at 711; see, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I, art. X. 
 84. See James W. Ely Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in 
the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 326–27 (1999). 
In its first interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court affirmed 
that it carried the same meaning as the phrase “law of the land” used centuries 
earlier in the Magna Carta, which embodies both procedural and substantive 
restraints on government. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
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from constitutional text guaranteeing process to substantive 
protections relies on convoluted, rather anachronistic logic, but 
years of judicial decisions have cemented it within American 
jurisprudence.85 These include late eighteenth-century state 
court cases considering the precursors to due process through 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana in 1897, Euclid v. Ambler in 1926, Rowe 
v. Wade in 1973, and Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015.86 Despite 
oscillations in the Court’s willingness to invalidate legislation 
in its name, through the years substantive due process has 
come to offer several discrete categorical protections.87 
Specifically, these include protection against ultra vires 
actions, actions for an improper public purpose, irrational 
“arbitrary and capricious” actions, and actions that impose an 
excessive burden on individuals.88 
Courts performing substantive due process analysis might 
not say so explicitly, but review of case history supports the 
persistence of the above categories.89 For example, the Court’s 
 
59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855). 
 85. See Ely, supra note 84, at 316–19. Justice Scalia has voiced his opinion on 
the doctrine generally: “If I thought that ‘substantive due process’ were a 
constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-
and-switch taxation.” United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 86. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–99 (2015); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 167 (1973); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 397 (1926); 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); Ely, supra note 84, at 327–28. 
 87. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: 
Exploring the “Arbitrary and Capricious” Test and Substantive Rationality Review 
of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 661, 707–11 (1989); see 
also Stephen Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional 
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (presenting the controversial Lochner era 
Court as a transitional period rather than an aberration). Though an opponent to 
substantive due process, Justice Brandeis’s description of the doctrine in New 
State Ice Co. v. Lieberman towards the end of the Lochner era foretells its current 
status. See 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He said, 
We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in 
our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We 
have power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by 
the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters 
of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on 
our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would 
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. 
Id. 
 88. See Plater, supra note 87, at 707–11. 
 89. Retreating from the liberal seizures of authority in the name of due 
process by the Lochner era Court, some subsequent Courts have avoided the 
words. Some scholars, likewise, argued that West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937), and the later case, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), 
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manner of reviewing congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause suggests that review of ultra vires 
legislation or regulatory action fits within substantive due 
process.90 Personal liberty cases show that regulation can 
cause such undue or excessive “burdens” that it amounts to a 
violation of due process. In such cases, the Court tries to 
determine if the regulation so restricts the ability of certain 
individuals to exercise a fundamental right that it deprives 
them of due process.91 Similarly, land-use regulation cases 
throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have 
expressly described review of proper public purpose as a matter 
of substantive due process.92 The shape of rationality review 
changed with West Coast Hotel and the unofficial end of the 
Lochner era, but it also remained a central component of due 
process.93 Just a year after West Coast Hotel, in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., the Court expressed what continues 
to be the rationality benchmark for economic, non-fundamental 
regulations, requiring that they be neither arbitrary nor 
irrational.94 
 
ended not just economic substantive due process, but substantive due process 
entirely. See Richard Myers, The End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 557, 561 (1988); Daniel Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due 
Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 218–19 (1987). But it persists, if restrained, “[a]s a 
general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decision-making in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992). West Coast Hotel itself contains language indicating the 
persistence of substantive due process. 300 U.S. at 391, 399 (“[R]egulation which 
is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the 
community is due process . . . . Legislative response to that conviction cannot be 
regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have to decide.”). 
 90. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.9 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Nor can the majority’s opinion [that the Act is not constitutionally 
justified by the Commerce Clause] fairly be compared to Lochner v. New 
York . . . . Unlike Lochner and our more recent ‘substantive due process’ cases, 
today’s decision enforces only the Constitution and not ‘judicial policy 
judgments.’”). 
 91. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 92. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Nectow v. 
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185, 188 (1928); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
544 U.S. 528, 542–43 (2005). 
 93. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S at 399–400. 
 94. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). For other 
examples, see U.S. v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 
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Rationality review and proper purpose review relate, with 
the former tending to follow the latter. In considering 
regulation of non-fundamental rights, courts will accept any 
conceivable proper public purpose and then require the 
challenger to prove the irrationality of the means chosen to 
serve that end. This presumption of constitutionality makes it 
a relatively deferential standard.95 When regulation threatens 
more constitutionally valued rights, though, courts shift that 
burden.96 In such cases, courts apply intermediate or strict 
scrutiny and require the government, first, to forward the 
purpose justifying the intrusion into private rights and, second, 
to demonstrate the rationality of the means chosen. Depending 
on the private interest at stake, such heightened scrutiny can 
amount either to a relatively neutral standard between the 
parties or even to a presumption of invalidity. 
Though only a quick review, this demonstrates the breadth 
of the Due Process Clause, both in the variety of protections it 
offers and the diverse circumstances in which they can arise, 
particularly in comparison to the limited scope of the Takings 
Clause as originally understood by the Framers. Setting aside 
the practical challenges inherent in performing substantive 
due process analysis, this landscape of Fifth Amendment 
protections leaves a relatively clear distinction between those 
offered by the Due Process Clause—protecting against 
arbitrary government action—and the Takings Clause—
protecting against uncompensated confiscation of property. The 
choice of analysis for any particular case should proceed 
logically from this distinction. 
B. Evolution of Takings Doctrine 
“A crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine” tracing 
the line between private property rights and public controls 
began to take form—one string, one knot, one case at a time, 
starting in 1922.97 In that year, an activist Supreme Court 
 
(1997); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971). See also Carolene Prods., 
304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (differentiating between rational basis due process review and 
strict scrutiny, especially where government actions reflect prejudice against 
“discrete and insular minorities”). 
 95. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. 
 96. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 97. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) 
(quoting Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years 
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gave birth to regulatory takings doctrine when, for the first 
time, it struck down a regulatory limitation on the ground that 
it amounted to an excessive “taking” of property rights without 
payment of just compensation.98 In that case, Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon, Justice Holmes found that a statute limiting 
mining so intruded on or excessively burdened property rights 
that it had the same qualitative effect as a physical taking 
under eminent domain.99 By finding that a regulation’s effect 
could in some cases be so oppressive as to be the equivalent of 
an eminent domain condemnation, Justice Holmes vastly 
expanded the umbrella of protections theretofore provided by 
the constitutional “taking” concept.100 
Justice Holmes’s analysis for such regulatory takings 
focused on “diminution”—the amount by which the challenged 
regulation diminishes the value of the property as compared to 
 
of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 S. CT. REV. 63, 63 (1962)). 
 98. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (applying Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence via the Fourteenth Amendment to a state regulation 
preventing the mining removal of underground coal pillars that were critical in 
supporting homes, streets, and streams on the land’s surface). 
 99. Id. at 415–16. 
 100. See id. at 415. In finding that a regulation could be so excessive as to 
amount to a taking in Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes said “[w]hen [diminution of 
value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.” Id. at 413 
(emphasis added). Some jurists thus use the term “eminent domain” to mean the 
same thing as a constitutionally excessive invalid taking. But as we interpret the 
grammar and logic of Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes was using “eminent domain” in 
the regulatory setting as denoting the remedy—compensation—not as the cause of 
action. When a governmental entity files a complaint in a physical or title 
eminent domain condemnation suit, the government entity is the plaintiff, the 
property is the defendant in rem, eminent domain is the cause of action, and the 
remedy is issuance of title to the government with the order that the government 
pay the amount of compensation judicially assessed. In physical/title eminent 
domain actions, as opposed to cases of constitutionally excessive regulatory 
takings, the triggering measure of the compensation requirement is completely 
different in the two settings. In eminent domain, the taking of even one square 
inch requires compensation (for the actual value of the inch, plus the value of all 
consequential damages attributable to the governmental take). In regulatory 
taking cases, on the other hand, courts undertake a subjective diminution-
balancing process to determine whether a taking of property value has gone “too 
far”; substantial amounts of loss of property use and value are possible without 
any compensation so long as they aren’t found to have gone too far. The options 
for remedy are also different. In eminent domain cases, just compensation is the 
automatically granted remedy; when a regulation has been determined to be 
excessive as applied, however, the government has the option to rescind the 
regulation, to amend the regulation as applied, or to pay compensation. 
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if it remained unregulated.101 If regulatory diminution of 
property value “goes too far,” he cryptically declared, the 
regulation is invalid.102 He mentioned no other criterion for 
takings judgments.103 Diminution of property value, weighed 
against that sphinx-like “too far” criterion, accordingly became 
the canonic takings test, cited verbatim by decades of courts in 
a cacophony of erratic decisions as they reviewed the validity of 
regulatory inhibition of property rights in a wide swathe of 
cases.104 
Diminution clearly seems a valid and relevant focus for the 
constitutional test, with a ring of appropriate fairness in 
tracing the line between private and public rights. Invalid 
regulatory “takings,” simply put, impose a constitutionally 
excessive impact on private property interests—meaning it 
“goes too far” in diminishing the private property value, 
requiring the private property owner individually to bear a 
burden that should be laid upon the public as a whole. That 
basic understanding, however, does nothing to define an 
objective standard for determining what qualifies as “too far.” 
Despite the place of Pennsylvania Coal’s constitutional 
takings analysis as the progenitor test of regulatory takings, 
the internal confusions and significant unacknowledged public 
 
 101. See id. at 413. 
 102. Id. at 415. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. (“When [diminution of property value] reaches a certain 
magnitude, in most if not in all cases . . . [when it] goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”) (emphasis added). Note the pioneering semantics of the 
word “taking” as meaning “unconstitutionally excessive and hence invalid.” 
Brandeis in dissent said that diminution should be balanced against potential 
public harm, and that the baseline for diminution should be the whole coalfield, 
now defined by investment-backed expectations. See id. at 417, 419 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). Pennsylvania Coal, despite its mystifyingly vague defining line for 
takings validity, was so long the only game in town for constitutional authority on 
the point that one of us once wrote a footnote saying that it was so frequently 
cited that it took up eleven single-spaced pages in the Shepard’s Citation book (an 
archaic compendium of state and federal citations). That article’s editors declined 
the opportunity to publish such a footnote; perhaps the current editors will do so 
as a nod to an archaism. More than one thousand five hundred state and federal 




&earg=pdpsf&prid=3891c4fc-38d4-4e1b-ab16-c17d03bf5532 (last visited Nov. 20, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/7QAC-9RLV] (view “Citing Decisions” on the right-hand 
side of the page). 
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and private concerns within that case have continued to haunt, 
with some measure of relief particularly coming from three 
subsequent cases—Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. 
DeBenedictis, and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.105 
The canonic 1978 Penn Central case best characterizes the 
primary current constitutional inquiry for regulatory 
takings.106 In Penn Central, the Court provided guidance for 
identifying regulations that intrude too far into property rights 
by adding the Penn Central “triad” to Pennsylvania Coal.107 
This Penn Central triad directs a reviewing court to scrutinize 
(1) the extent of diminution, meaning the amount of private 
property loss caused, (2) the degree to which the regulation 
frustrates “investment backed expectations” as a subset of 
diminution, and (3) the “character of the government action.”108 
Following a clarification coming from Palazzolo, the latter 
phrase—the “third prong” of Penn Central—logically weighs 
the public protections and harm avoidance that motivated the 
regulation in the first place into the balance of private property 
loss.109 Through this analysis, property owners need to show 
 
 105. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978). For 
many years, the Court disingenuously avoided such cases, with the only exception 
being Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N. Y., 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Plater is 
reminded of what Justice Douglas said on a visit to his class in Tennessee many 
years ago when he was asked why the Court had largely avoided regulatory 
takings cases over the decades since Pennsylvania Coal. Justice Douglas said, as 
roughly remembered, “What do you expect? We have no idea how to draw those 
lines. How would you draw them?” Subsequently, the ascendancy of the 
privateering Right—generally anti-environmental, anti-regulatory at every 
level—has spawned a parade of heavily contested up and down regulatory takings 
cases, and the scholarship in the field has increased dramatically in volume and 
sagacity, in which no current scholar figures more prominently than our colleague 
John Echeverria. 
 106. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 107. Id. Similar to Pennsylvania Coal, in addition to its regulatory takings 
analysis, the Penn Central Court acknowledged that the disputed government 
action satisfied other substantive due process requirements, namely the proper 
public purpose and rationality requirements. Id. at 132–33; Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. 
at 415. 
 108. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. As delivered by Justice Brennan, this 
second consideration is analytically an element of the first. The Penn Central 
“triad” has become clearer over time, but it certainly was not when argued and 
decided. 
 109. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the 
third prong of Penn Central balances the public “purpose,” i.e., the harms targeted 
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that the diminution of property value has gone “too far,” and, in 
general, if the court finds that the regulation leaves the 
property owner with reasonable remaining property value, or 
that the potential public harm from the regulated individual 
action counterbalances the property value diminution, then 
whatever inhibition of property rights the regulation caused is 
constitutionally valid without compensation.110 
While Penn Central seems a logical refining of the 
regulatory takings notion as left by Pennsylvania Coal, just two 
years later, the Court in 1980 decided Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
which, while upholding the challenged regulation, seemingly 
added a new test to judge the constitutionality of land use 
restrictions.111 Tiburon had initiated a land use planning 
process to encourage density control in different areas of the 
city.112 The Aginses owned a piece of property zoned to allow 
construction of five separate homes overlooking San Francisco 
Bay, but they wanted a larger number of saleable units and 
challenged the restriction.113 
Building on dicta in the Penn Central majority opinion,114 
 
by the regulation). A late nineteenth-century ratemaking case described a similar 
analysis explicitly in the name of due process: 
When a court, without assuming itself to prescribe rates, is required to 
determine whether the rates prescribed by the legislature for a 
corporation controlling a public highway are, as an entirety, so unjust as 
to destroy the value of its property for all the purposes for which it was 
acquired, its duty is to take into consideration the interests both of the 
public and of the owner of the property, together with all other 
circumstances that are fairly to be considered in determining whether 
the legislature has, under the guise of regulating rates, exceeded its 
constitutional authority, and practically deprived the owner of property 
without due process of law. 
Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896). 
 110. Governing bodies, in defense of their burdensome actions against takings 
claims, will often point to matters of substantive due process, such as the 
legitimate public purpose served, their authority to address such purposes under 
the police power, or the rational manner in which the action addresses the harm, 
as justification. Beyond per se regulatory takings cases, courts generally give such 
arguments great credence, supporting the idea that the conceptual origins of 
regulatory takings lie within substantive due process. 
 111. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1980). 
 112. Id. at 257. 
 113. Id. Gideon Kanner, a California attorney who has achieved eminence in a 
career opposing government land use regulations as violations of private property 
rights, represented Mr. and Mrs. Donald Agins, in challenging zone restrictions 
limiting development to five (subsequently splendid) single-family residences. 
 114. In Penn Central, the Brennan majority opinion said in passing that “a use 
restriction may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation 
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their attorney argued that limiting the number of units effected 
a regulatory taking because, in combination with alleged bad 
faith motives by the town, it in effect rendered the property 
valueless and useless.115 Accepting this position would have 
forced the Court to go against established zoning precedent.116 
The Supreme Court, thus, saw this as an easy case and decided 
unanimously against the Aginses, finding that they had not 
suffered an unconstitutional regulatory taking because they 
had not suffered an excessive loss in property value.117 The 
Court’s decision, however—seemingly as a throw-away—also 
added further words in support of the ordinance’s validity: that 
the ordinance as applied was not a taking because it 
“substantially advance[d]” the legislative purposes.118 
Asking whether a regulation “substantially advances” the 
regulatory purpose focuses upon the internal logic and 
rationality of the governmental action—an inquiry that sounds 
 
of a substantial government purpose.” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
 115. Agins, 447 U.S. at 258; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, Agins, 
447 U.S. at 258. 
 116. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 115, at 55; see Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). 
 117. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262–63; see also Meeting Notes on Agins v. City of 
Tiburon from Harry Blackmun, Associate Supreme Court Justice (Apr. 18, 1980) 
(available through the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in the 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 314). 
 118. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in internal Court 
discussions over Agins, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern about the 
“substantially advances” language: 
[M]y concerns along this line could be completely allayed if you could see 
fit to put in somewhere in the opinion the following quotation from what 
you describe as the ‘seminal’ case of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 395 
(1926): 
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom 
or sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have 
indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least the reasons are 
sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said 
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such 
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare. 
This may just be a difference of nuance, but it seems to me that it allows 
the states more latitude . . . . 
Memorandum from William Rehnquist, Associate Supreme Court Justice, to 
Lewis F. Powell, Associate Supreme Court Justice, on Agins v. Tiburon (May 29, 
1980) (available through the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in 
the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 314). 
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in due process. It is not an inquiry into the impact upon the 
individual property owner, which presumably is the focus of 
the constitutional question whether private property rights 
have been “taken.” This language in Agins thus for the first 
time implicitly encumbered the classic takings test embodied in 
Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central with an added element of 
rational-basis review in addition to the regulatory takings 
rubric. As discussed later, the Court subsequently overruled 
the Agins “substantially advanced” test, but for a time it 
hitched even more due process language into the concept of 
regulatory takings.119 
Again, two years later, the Court decided Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., where it addressed a 
regulation that required installation of a cable box on a private 
building and held that regulations causing permanent physical 
occupations of private property per se effect a taking.120 
Although a regulatory requirement stood at issue in Loretto, 
the direct effect of the regulation was so clearly physical that it 
conceptually converged with an eminent domain analysis, the 
original understanding of the Takings Clause prohibiting 
physical or title takings without compensation. The Court 
accepted several substantive due process points—that the state 
had authority to promulgate the challenged regulation, that 
the regulation satisfied a proper public purpose, and even that 
the intrusion was small—but it still found that it effected a 
taking because the government action authorized a physical 
occupation of private property.121 Based on this understanding, 
it was the protection of the Takings Clause—and not the 
protections of substantive due process against ultra vires, 
improper public purpose, irrationality, or excessive burden—
that made Loretto-style regulatory takings unconstitutional. 
In 1987, in Keystone Bituminous, the Court fundamentally 
reconfigured the diminution analysis of Pennsylvania Coal. 
Without overtly overruling the 1922 case, Justice Stevens took 
virtually the same facts and law, coming from the same state, 
the same coal industry, and the same type of coal pillars, and 
declared that there was no excessive taking because diminution 
analysis should be based on “the parcel as a whole,” as 
 
 119. See discussion infra notes 158–166. 
 120. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982). 
 121. Id. at 425–26. 
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Brandeis had argued in dissent in 1922, not just on the 
regulated portion of the corporate property as Holmes had done 
and as Rehnquist and Scalia bitterly urged in Keystone.122 
Five years later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, an opinion by Justice Scalia launched another form of 
per se regulatory taking.123 It held that unless there was a 
saving basis in pre-existing common law tort or property 
doctrine, regulations that created a complete diminution of 
property value effected constitutionally invalid regulatory 
takings.124 
Thus by 1992, four distinct, coexistent lines of analysis fell 
under the blanket term of regulatory taking: (1) excessive 
diminution analysis balanced under the Penn Central triad; (2) 
per se complete diminutions under Lucas; (3) per se physical 
 
 122. Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); 
id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 
(1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 123. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). Justice Scalia’s 
definition of when his “categorical rule” was triggered was variously stated as a 
complete loss of value, and elsewhere an implication that a loss of “all 
economically viable [i.e. profitable] use” of property would likewise be 
categorically void. For a time, this forceful antiregulatory declamation pushed 
courts to declare a series of regulations unconstitutional. E.g., Arill v. Maiz, 992 F. 
Supp. 112, 120 (D.P.R. 1998); Philip Morris v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 
2002). No longer: 
Advocates for expanded property rights heralded the Supreme Court’s 
1992 decision in Lucas as the dawn of a new era in which landowners 
would obtain increased constitutional compensation for the burdens of 
regulation, and which would in turn discourage regulatory initiatives. 
The post-Lucas era has been a considerable disappointment to property 
rights advocates, however. Ensuing decisions have confined the 
categorical takings rule to regulations that result in complete economic 
wipeouts, a rare phenomenon. On the other hand, courts have 
expansively interpreted the decision’s exemption from compensation for 
regulations that merely forbid uses prohibited by “background 
principles” of property and nuisance law. . . . Lucas’s principal legacy lies 
in affording government defendants numerous effective categorical 
defenses with which to defeat takings claims. 
Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of 
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
321, 321 (2005). 
 124. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 (“A fortiori the legislature’s recitation of a 
noxious-use justification [a rationally based execution of a proper public purpose] 
cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory 
takings must be compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be 
allowed.”). Scalia characterized his new rule as “categorical,” but his inclusion of 
tort and property law balancings make that characterization semantically 
incorrect. 
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appropriations under Loretto; and (4) regulations that fail to 
substantially advance legitimate public interests under 
Agins.125 Although the first two seem to address the protections 
imagined of regulatory takings by the Pennsylvania Coal 
Court, and the third addresses the protections guaranteed by 
the Framers, the fourth skewed the line of takings inquiries in 
a manner that affected the subsequent exaction condition 
cases.126 
C. Exactions Laden with a Maladaptation of Takings 
Jurisprudence 
In the 1987 Nollan case, the Supreme Court extended the 
semantic conflation of due process and regulatory takings to 
exactions.127 In that case, the California Coastal Commission 
granted a homeowner a permit to convert a small seasonal 
beachfront cottage into a large three-story year-round home on 
the condition that he dedicate a pedestrian right-of-passage 
along the beach.128 With this right of passage, the Commission 
intended to facilitate connection between the public beaches to 
the far right and far left of the property.129 The homeowners 
challenged this condition as a regulatory taking.130 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion confirmed the legitimacy 
of exaction conditions but struck down the particular easement 
exaction in the case.131 His opinion, citing the “substantially 
advances” part of the Agins holding, said that an exaction 
attached to a permit will be constitutionally valid if: (1) the 
 
 125. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 126. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 127. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
 128. Id. at 827–28. Graphically, the agency attorneys poorly presented and 
argued the logic of the exaction, but it apparently was a tiny piece of a hoped-for 
easement that would visually present a passage for surfers carrying their boards. 
They also could have raised a Public Trust Doctrine justification for the 
passageway, but this raised Scalian hackles leading to a dramatic compromise 
between him and the dissenters. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in 
the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10637, 10654 (2005). 
 129. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
 130. Id. at 829. 
 131. Id. at 834–35. Some privateering property rights interests undoubtedly 
hoped that the Supreme Court through Nollan would outlaw the concept of 
exactions, especially so when they heard that the newest member of the Court, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, would deliver the Court’s decision. Boy, were they 
surprised. 
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government agency could have denied the entire permit 
outright without creating the excessive loss of an invalid 
taking, and (2) the permit condition had an “essential nexus” 
with the regulatory purposes being weighed in the permit 
decision.132 
This “nexus test” in Nollan required a logical causative 
nexus between the potential impact of development and the 
exaction required by the permitting authority. The nexus 
concept seems completely logical: individually negotiated and 
applied exactions pose a risk of coercion not present in 
generally applicable zoning regulations, so protecting private 
rights in the exaction context requires a somewhat higher 
standard of rationality scrutiny than in the zoning context.133 
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia did not use the phrases 
“unconstitutional condition” or “substantive due process,” but 
repeatedly used the word “taking” in orienting his “nexus” 
requirement.134 At that time, the Court still considered Agins a 
good statement of takings law, which probably explained his 
failure to make the distinction. If the condition lacked an 
essential nexus with the purpose for the permitting program, it 
would not advance the permitting program’s legitimate 
purposes, and thus it would fail the Agins test, which had been 
characterized as a takings test. 
In the Nollan setting, Justice Scalia could not see how the 
expansive reconstruction of a house would cause the need for 
pedestrian passage along the beach parallel to the water’s 
edge.135 The Court struck down the beach easement condition, 
 
 132. Id. at 834, 835. 
 133. Amici representing the home construction industry advocated for the 
rationality-nexus approach to judicial review of exactions that the Court 
ultimately adopted. Justice Scalia in his majority opinion even cites some of the 
state cases raised by the amici to support the stricture he requires of the nexus. 
See Brief of the National Association of Home Builders and California Building 
Industry Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86–133), U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1384. 
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court employed a similar analysis to uphold a 
conditional grant of federal funding to the state as a valid exercise of the spending 
power. 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987). There, the Court approved conditioning 
interstate highway funding on the state raising its drinking age to twenty-one 
because it was reasonable in scope, rather than coercive, and related to the 
federal interests served by the highway program. Id. at 207–09. This case arose 
from a controversy between governments rather than between government and 
person, correspondingly the analysis did not invoke due process. See id. at 205. 
 134. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 834. 
 135. Id. Although he, surprisingly, said it would be constitutional—there 
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and Mr. Nollan, who had already gone ahead and built his new 
house, got to keep it without any public easement dedication.136 
Although this holding was not surprising, it freighted exactions 
law with the takings label from Agins, and inaccurately made 
Nollan a highly derived descendant of Pennsylvania Coal. 
The 1994 Dolan decision added to the Nollan nexus 
concept but likewise failed to separate its inquiry from the 
regulatory takings rubric.137 The owner of a hardware store 
chain decided to expand her store and redevelop the one-acre 
parking lot to include a collection of boutiques and other 
commercial spaces.138 The existing store was profitable, but the 
new plan would be substantially more so. The city planning 
agency agreed to allow this expansion but required dedications 
by the owner according to negotiation guidelines set out in the 
Community Development Code.139 Specifically, the city asked 
for a public strip of protective land along a nearby stream that 
the new building would severely encroach upon, in order to 
alleviate flood risk.140 As a second exaction, the agency 
required that the property owner provide a bike path so that 
people coming from a subdivision to the south of the new 
development would not have to drive there by car, thereby 
mitigating an increase in traffic flow attributable to the new 
complex.141 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, struck down 
the exactions.142 His opinion did not argue that denying the 
expansion would have excessively diminished the value of the 
property—the classic takings question—nor did he deny that 
the newly expanded development posed a rationally and 
 
would be a sufficient rational nexus—if the agency required Nollan to give public 
access to a viewing spot upon his land if the house expansion perpendicularly 
blocked the ocean view of passing tourists! Id. at 836. 
 136. Id. at 839–40. Note how this raises an interesting severability issue. See 
infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–91 (1994). 
 138. Id. at 379. 
 139. Id. at 379–80 (citing Cmty. Dev. Code § 18.120.180.A.8: “Where landfill 
and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, the 
City shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for greenway 
adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a suitable 
elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the 
floodplain in accordance with the adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan.”). 
 140. Id. at 380. 
 141. Id. at 381. 
 142. Id. at 395–96. 
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causally related “nexus” to the need for floodwater passage and 
traffic mitigation. Instead he initiated an additional test of 
“rough proportionality” beyond the Nollan nexus requirement, 
mandating that exactions relate “both in nature and extent” to 
the proposed development’s impact.143 The city, he argued, had 
not provided proof that the floodway and bike path exactions 
were roughly proportional to the need created by the proposed 
new commercial development (unsurprisingly, because no one 
had ever before mentioned such a test).144 Rehnquist, 
moreover, said that the procedural burden was upon the city to 
prove this novel proportionality requirement whenever an 
exaction was “adjudicative” (i.e., based on flexible negotiation), 
rather than “legislated” (i.e., specifically set out in the text of 
the ordinance).145 Other formulations of heightened due 
process rationality review call for such burden-shifting, and, in 
some settings, this makes sense as a matter of due process.146 
But Nollan did not reach this issue, and such burden shifting 
neither aligns with the logic of modern land use decision-
making, where win-win negotiation is a usual shared goal,147 
nor takes place in regulatory takings analysis.148 The city, as a 
 
 143. Id. at 391. 
 144. Id. at 395–96. 
 145. Id. at 391 n.8. 
 146. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 147. In a wide array of modern land use law settings—planned unit 
developments, and most other non-Euclidean zoning, as well as in most 
subdivision regulations—private and public actors flexibly negotiate exaction 
conditions to achieve win-win optimal arrangements, balancing private and public 
necessities. Basic land use ordinances generally do not spell out specifically the 
particular requirements for each individual master permit. Thus if Rehnquist’s 
burden-shifting standard for “adjudicated” conditions is applied, most land use 
planning processes would bear the burden of showing constitutionality—i.e., a 
presumption of unconstitutionality or heightened burden of scrutiny that would 
have to be overcome in rebuttal. His judicial review distinction between 
“legislated” conditions and “adjudicated” conditions in Dolan, however, does not 
seem to be generally followed. It may have been based on an Oregon case which 
made that distinction, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioner of Washington 
County, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (Or. 1973), but that case has subsequently been 
substantially modified by the Oregon Supreme Court. See Valley & Siletz R.R. v. 
Laudahl, 681 P.2d 109 (Or. 1984) (noting that “quasi-judicial” negotiations are 
commonplace and fall short of required shifting of the burden of proof of 
constitutionality); Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980). To 
assert that the presumption of governmental validity that usually applies during 
rational basis review did not apply, Rehnquist only cited Nollan, which does not 
actually discuss burden-shifting. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8; Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). 
 148. Rehnquist dealt with Justice Stevens’s dissenting argument that this was 
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result, had not prepared the previously unrequired analysis, so 
the Court summarily struck down the conditions.149 
The analysis formed jointly by Nollan and Dolan has since 
become the dominant judicial test for deciding if the 
government has attached “unconstitutional conditions” to a 
permitting process. Because the Court decided Nollan and 
Dolan while the Agins “substantially advance[d]” language was 
still considered a component of regulatory takings analysis, for 
a time Nollan-Dolan also migrated into regulatory takings 
analysis. Two subsequent Supreme Court cases should have 
trashed that idea. 
Eastern Enterprises in 1998 involved a statute requiring 
companies to pay into a compensation fund retroactively for 
employee miners that contracted black lung disease.150 The 
Eastern Enterprises corporation challenged the law, arguing 
that it should not have to contribute for the former employees 
of a corporate predecessor in interest.151 Subsequently, in a 
split vote with no majority opinion, the Supreme Court decided 
in favor of Eastern Enterprises.152 A plurality opinion said that 
it was an invalid regulatory taking.153 Four dissenters, and 
Justice Kennedy in concurrence, maintained that it was not a 
takings case—the substantive due process test applied 
instead—only differing in whether they saw the facts as 
showing the necessary nexus relationship between the 
corporation and the former coal miners to justify forcing 
retroactive payment.154 
In Eastern Enterprises, then, the majority of Supreme 
 
a due process issue by asserting the irrelevant and uncontroverted fact that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied the Fifth Amendment’s taking provision to the 
states. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383 n.5. 
 149. Id. at 395–96. 
 150. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 504 (1998). 
 151. Id. at 517. Here is the interesting twist: In 1997, one of the authors 
received a request from an attorney in the Boston law firm that was then 
representing Eastern Enterprises, asking whether he could informally give advice 
on “a regulatory takings case which we now have in the Supreme Court.” They 
assumed that any challenge to a regulation affecting their client’s money was a 
“takings” challenge. When the attorney described the situation, the author 
demurred. “You don’t have a regulatory takings case. You have a substantive due 
process case: You’re dealing with the propriety of a retroactive monetary 
assessment, and that’s substantive due process.” So the firm made that argument 
in the Supreme Court, in addition to a “takings” argument. 
 152. Id. at 538. 
 153. Id. at 504. 
 154. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Court Justices recognized that the monetary funding issue did 
not speak to regulatory takings. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
baldly stated that: 
In my view, . . . the relevant portions of the Coal Industry 
Retiree Health Benefit Act . . . must be invalidated as 
contrary to essential due process principles, without regard 
to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I concur in 
the judgment holding the Coal Act unconstitutional but 
disagree with the plurality’s Takings Clause analysis, 
which, it is submitted, is incorrect and quite unnecessary for 
decision of the case.155 
The dissenters, too, argued that due process was indeed the 
issue, not takings law, and that a sufficient nexus relationship 
did exist to support a retroactive funding requirement. Justice 
Breyer wrote for the four dissenters, saying, “there is no need 
to torture the Takings Clause to fit this case . . . . The Due 
Process Clause . . . safeguards citizens from arbitrary or 
irrational legislation.”156 
So by actual count, five of the nine Justices in Eastern 
Enterprises based their opinions on a tightened definition of 
what was properly a due process question, refusing to define it 
as a taking issue.157 Carefully parsed, the five votes in the split 
Kennedy-Breyer concurring and dissenting opinions constitute 
a majority of the Court limiting the Takings Clause to the 
canonic Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central formulations, 
with a distinctly different role for the rationality and causation 
requirements of due process. 
Seven years later, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., the Court 
 
 155. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). He also stated, 
[T]he Takings Clause . . . has not been understood to be a substantive or 
absolute limit on the government’s power to act. The Clause operates as 
a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants 
so long as it pays the charge . . . . “This basic understanding of the 
Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the 
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.” 
See id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (emphasis and internal citations 
omitted)). 
 156. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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again came close to a decisive separation of the mistaken 
conflation of takings and due process concepts.158 In that case, 
the energy company challenged a Hawaii law limiting the 
company’s right to charge excessive rents to its dealers who 
leased company-owned service stations.159 Chevron argued that 
the statute was “an unconstitutional regulatory taking” of its 
property rights, not because the company alleged an excessive 
diminution of its property value, but because it “did not 
substantially advance proper state interests,” using the Agins 
language.160 Chevron did not allege a separate due process 
violation, just a claim of invalid regulatory taking under the 
Agins formulation.161 
The Lingle Court, in a unanimous opinion written by 
Justice O’Connor, held that this was not an invalid regulatory 
taking because Chevron had not alleged or proved an excessive 
diminution of its property value.162 Most significantly, the 
Lingle Court declared that the Agins “substantially advanced” 
factor was not a valid takings test.163 Instead, the Court 
specified that takings were to be judged by the excessive-loss 
test of Pennsylvania Coal as channeled by Penn Central, which 
the regulated corporation had not pleaded.164 Since Chevron 
 
 158. 544 U.S. 528, 540, 542 (2005). 
 159. Id. at 533. 
 160. Id. at 544. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 548. 
 163. Id. at 542. (“The ‘substantially-advances’ formula suggests a means-ends 
test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in 
achieving some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of this nature has some logic 
in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any 
legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs 
afoul of the Due Process Clause. [T]he Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to 
protect the individual against the exercise of power without any reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. But such a test 
is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been ‘taken’ for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 846 (1998))). Interestingly, Justice Scalia, whose inopportune use of the 
“substantially advances” language in Nollan initiated much of the subsequent 
confusion, may have laid the foundation for this change in Lingle with his opinion 
in Lucas. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023–26 (1992) (internal 
citations omitted) (“‘Harmful or noxious use’ analysis was, in other words, simply 
the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that “‘‘land-use regulation 
does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advances legitimate state interests’” . . . 
it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to 
distinguish regulatory ‘takings’—which require compensation—from regulatory 
deprivations that do not require compensation.”). 
 164. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). 
 782 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
had offered neither a proper takings argument nor a proper 
due process argument, the Court dismissed its claims on 
summary judgment.165 
The Lingle case, properly understood, should have broadly 
clarified the semantic confusion reflected in the Nollan and 
Dolan decisions as instigated by the Agins conflation. But it did 
not. Subsequent courts should have discerned from Lingle that 
only those tests identifying and weighing property value 
diminution are regulatory takings inquiries. Invalid regulatory 
takings occur when regulations fail the tests epitomized by 
Penn Central and Palazzolo, or by Lucas if zero property value 
remains. Rational-basis due process inquiries, using rubrics 
like “substantially advanced,” are not regulatory takings tests. 
After Lingle, it should have been clear that if challengers wish 
to advance due process claims, they necessarily have to plead 
and prove them as such. The Lingle Court, however, 
understandably did not think to go off on a side note 
retroactively removing the takings label from Nollan-Dolan 
exaction reviews; Lingle was not an exactions case. Subsequent 
exaction cases thus have failed to note the sharp distinction 
between due process and regulatory takings that the Lingle 
decision had made,166 and courts and practitioners alike 
continue to speak of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine 
framed in Nollan and Dolan as a “takings” issue rather than a 
due process inquiry. 
D. A Semantic Lexicon of Public Authority/Private 
Property Rights 
Given the continuing jumble of rhetoric in this area, the 
following “semantic lexicon” aspires to clarify some stable 
definitions and explanations for major relevant terms in 
contemporary constitutional property rights controversies, 
addressing one of the most complicated challenges of modern 
democratic governance, the balance between public and private 
rights—between governmental power in the service of a 
collective public interest, juxtaposed against private individual 
rights. 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 546. 
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1. “Takings” Semantics 
 Taking: The concept of governmental “taking” has two very 
different applications, physical, and regulatory. But note at the 
outset that the word “taking” has rather ambiguous meanings. 
In both the physical and regulatory setting, governmental 
action takes away the private property rights of corporate or 
individual owners. In the physical setting, virtually every case 
requires compensation. In the regulatory setting, on the other 
hand, in many or most cases the taking is not 
unconstitutionally excessive, so no compensation has to be 
paid, despite some decline in private property market value. 
 
Physical Taking: is the use of governmental authority to 
condemn and seize the possession, use, and/or title of private 
property, most commonly occurring through overt, 
governmentally acknowledged exercises of eminent domain, 
with compensation required in virtually all cases.167 In rare 
cases, as in Loretto, if a regulatory act causes a de facto 
physical-like appropriation of property rights, it too can effect 
an invalid physical taking, requiring rescission or just 
compensation.168 In the more recent case of Horne v. 
Department of Agriculture too, when government action leads 
to permanent occupation or possession of real or personal 
property, it falls squarely within the protection of the Takings 
Clause as understood by the Framers.169 
 
Regulatory Taking: Under the canonic Pennsylvania 
Coal case,170 an act of government effects an invalid regulatory 
taking when a regulation goes “too far,” burdening property to 
the effect that it excessively diminishes the value of the 
property, so that in a particular context the public must pay for 
the benefit of the regulation or waive the regulation’s 
application to the property owner. A court would identify 
unconstitutional excessiveness by weighing the impact of the 
 
 167. Note Holmes’s examples of uncompensated physical takings in Pa. Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413–15 (1922). 
 168. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982). 
 169. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 
426. 
 170. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415–16. 
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regulation in light of the Penn Central triad (see below).171 
Alternatively, in the improbable event that the government 
action completely destroys all economic value, with no tort or 
property offsets, Justice Scalia’s now-diminished Lucas opinion 
would define it as a per se categorically invalid regulatory 
taking.172 
 
The Penn Central Triad: The currently dominant 
regulatory taking test comes to us in three-pronged triad form 
from the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal decision, via the 1978 Penn 
Central case. Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal, fingered 
diminution—the loss of market value due to a regulation—as 
the bellwether of unconstitutionality. He rather unhelpfully 
defined “the general rule” that a regulation was 
unconstitutional if diminution “goes too far.” Brandeis in 
dissent accepted diminution’s relevance, but using the example 
of mining releases of poisonous gases he asserted that the 
degree of public risk or harm was also relevant. 
In Penn Central Justice Brennan tried to clarify 
Pennsylvania Coal, saying that courts needed to weigh at least 
three factors to determine a regulation’s constitutional 
fairness: (1) the amount of diminution, (2) the owner’s 
investment-backed expectations (IBEs), and (3) the “character” 
of the governmental action, whatever that meant. 
In Palazzolo, Justice O’Connor gave the third prong a 
major clarification: channeling Brandeis’s focus on public 
harm, she said that Penn Central’s third prong called for 
counterbalancing the first two prongs against “the purposes 
served, as well as the effects produced, by [the] regulation.”173 
 
 171. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 172. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). Although many 
people say that a regulation is a “taking” meaning that it is unconstitutional, in 
actuality most “takes” of private property are not unconstitutional. Virtually every 
regulation takes away some of the market value that a property would have if 
unregulated, but most such regulatory takings are not constitutionally invalid 
excessive expropriations of property values—they don’t “go too far.” Thus, 
semantic hygiene would appropriately be best served if the word “taking” was 
always coupled with a distinguishing adjective: e.g., a “valid” or “invalid” 
regulatory taking, or an “excessive” or “expropriatively unconstitutional” taking. 
Given human frailty and the instinctive tendency to abbreviate, however, many 
people will undoubtedly continue to use the labeling of a rule as “a taking” to 
mean that, via due process or excessive loss of value, it is in some way 
unconstitutional. 
 173. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
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Logically, it is naïve to judge the constitutionality of a 
regulation without explicitly weighing the public reasons that 
initially spurred it. No private property owner has a 
constitutional right to be paid for not imposing greater harms 
upon the public, so the degree of public harm that a regulation 
avoids weighs against the private owner’s diminution of value. 
 
Investment-backed expectations: IBE refers to the 
economic value and available uses of a property anticipated by 
the owner at the time of acquisition. Professor Frank 
Michelman invented the IBE concept in a 1967 article 
surveying the field of regulatory takings law.174 IBEs have 
potential utility for both attackers and defenders of 
regulations. For attackers, the recentness of an acquisition 
investment increases the severity of the diminution. For 
defenders of regulations, the expectations that the property 
buyer had when acquiring the property should color the 
fairness or unfairness of the degree of diminution. If the 
expectation was that a large property parcel would generate 
substantial profits, the fact that a small, regulated part of it 
cannot be so developed does not substantially reduce the 
overall profit expectation. If a great deal of anticipated profit 
was made before a regulation blocked further profits, the 
revenue gained in accordance with expectations weighs in favor 
of the regulation’s validity (as discussed in “Baseline 
denominators”). If one party purchased several adjacent 
parcels of land at roughly the same time, IBEs mean that the 
court can weigh profits and diminution across all the parcels in 
the entire investment, not just on the separately viewed 
regulated parcels.175 
If buyers purchase with notice of a pre-existing regulatory 
 
(emphasis added) (commenting on Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127). 
 174. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1213, 
1233 (1967). The IBE concept was not originally intended as a constitutional test, 
although it became so. 
 175. See K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998); 
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017). This echoes a tussle between 
Justices Scalia and O’Connor in Palazzolo. O’Connor argued the majority position 
that under investment-backed expectation logic, the prior-notice gamble 
diminishes a takings plaintiff’s fairness claim because most landowners in 
forming fair expectations about their property would objectively consider 
reasonable, pre-existing restrictions. Palazzollo, 533 U.S. at 634–35 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
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constraint on the property and then turn around and try to 
attack the diminution as unconstitutionally excessive, IBEs 
weigh against them. The buyers were gambling that the 
regulation would be stricken and that they would receive a 
windfall—which is not a right. As the Court said in Murr v. 
Wisconsin, “The reasonable expectations of an acquirer of land 
must acknowledge legitimate restrictions affecting his or her 
subsequent use . . . of the property.”176 
 
Baseline denominators: Although most agree with 
Holmes that diminution is pertinent to determining regulatory 
constitutionality, what physical property should provide the 
baseline for this assessment? Should it be the property as a 
whole, as Brandeis argued in Pennsylvania Coal, or just the 
regulated portion of the property, a divide-and-conquer 
definition urged by Justice Rehnquist that dramatically 
increases the prospects for invalidity? After Keystone 
Bituminous, the law now generally adopts Brandeis’s 
dissenting view of the conceptual baseline: you weigh the 
diminution against the scope of the entire investment. This 
incorporates the logic of “investment-backed expectations.” 177 
 
Eminent domain: Eminent domain takings constitute an 
intrinsic, universal, and clearly necessary power of government 
to appropriate private property involuntarily for the public use 
via a condemnation action in court, with the requirement that 
just compensation be paid. A court transfers title to the 
government entity upon a showing that the condemning agency 
has proper delegated condemnation power, a proper public 
purpose (and no poison purpose), a design for the condemnation 
that rationally serves the official purpose, and proper 
procedures followed, with fair compensation determined by the 
 
 176. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 177. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987). Note that there also can be a time baseline: In Pennsylvania Coal, for 
instance, the major coal field had been purchased circa 1903 and had generated 
what today would be millions of dollars in profits before the 1921 state statute 
was passed preventing further removal of coal. The baseline for diminution of 
value can extend back in time via IBEs. In the setting of Pennsylvania Coal, the 
original investment had paid off handsomely prior to the 1921 regulation.  Pa. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). We would argue that there is no a priori 
right to generate a further profit after the date of the regulation if a 
constitutionally fair profit has been made prior to the regulation. 
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trier of fact. Courts usually defer broadly to the government’s 
defined choice of condemnation, focusing primarily on 
quantifying just compensation. Analytically, however, 
condemnations are subject to judicial scrutiny under the 
applicable federal or state Administrative Procedure Act as 
well as substantive due process criteria. 
Some commentators apply the term “eminent domain” to 
cases where a regulation is found to be an unconstitutionally 
excessive invalid taking—probably because compensation must 
be paid unless the agency waives the regulation’s application to 
the successful claimant.178 Properly used, however, the phrase 
eminent domain only applies to physical taking of land or title. 
Applying this term to the regulatory setting is inartful and 
misleading. 
 
Inverse condemnation: Physical eminent domain is 
usually an overt court action asking for transfer of title and 
possession (in fee, or less) brought by a government agency as 
plaintiff against a defined parcel of land as defendant, with 
payment of assessed just compensation. In some cases, 
however, where government is in effect taking a possessory use 
of land without acknowledging it—the classic example: low-
level airplane flight paths at state-run airports, taking 
easements of noise, particle pollution, and physical passage 
from affected properties. Where agency conduct is de facto 
taking property rights from individual property owners—and 
sovereign immunity makes tort liability unlikely—the 
individuals can bring a constitutional action in inverse 
condemnation. The term “inverse” stems from the switch in 
complainant compared to eminent domain proceedings: the 
defendant landowner sues the potential plaintiff government 
agency, asking the court to force the public agency to bring an 
eminent domain condemnation action, with compensation 
damages, against the plaintiffs themselves. It’s sort of 
“Property owner ex rel. Gov’t Agency v. The Same Property 
owner.” 
Some privateering plaintiffs bring so-called inverse 
condemnation actions against regulations, but analytically 
these are a different beast, measured by regulatory takings 
 
 178.  See, e.g., 1-1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (2017) (“[R]egulative 
legislation . . . [can] come[] within the purview of the law of eminent domain.”). 
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doctrine, not physical takings doctrine. Because they 
specifically seek monetary damages, they are often 
strategically advanced as threats meant to deter regulation at 
the start. 
2. “Due Process” Semantics: 
 Procedural Due Process: Everyone knows procedural 
due process, right? You are entitled to get all procedures 
required by positive law, plus those identified as 
constitutionally necessary under a Mathews v. Eldridge 
procedural balance.179 
 
 Substantive Due Process: With the terms takings and 
regulatory takings accounting for physical invasions and 
excessive regulatory burdens on property, substantive due 
process generally refers to the remaining protections 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, namely protection from 
ultra vires government action, action without proper public 
purpose, irrational “arbitrary and capricious” government 
action, and the like. Thus challenges of government authority, 
zoning-type reviews of proper public purpose, and rational-
basis proportionality and logical nexus analyses, all speak of 
substantive due process, not a takings inquiry. 
 
 Exactions: The term “exactions” refers to conditions and 
requirements placed by land-use agencies upon grants of 
permit meant to mitigate or offset the public harms that the 
development project will likely cause or exacerbate—in 
standard subdivision regulations or otherwise. As a matter of 
threshold context, the developer is asking for the requested 
permit as a privilege, not for a permit as-of-right. Accordingly, 
the agency could have denied the permit without creating an 
invalid regulatory taking but decides to issue the permit so 
long as the permittee grants the mitigating, offsetting exaction 
to the public—in monetary terms or in kind. Due to the obvious 
 
 179. This balance directs courts to determine the amount of procedure 
constitutionally required before a deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurs by 
considering the specific private interest at stake, the risk of erroneous 
deprivations under the current procedures, and any government interests limiting 
the alternate or additional procedures practically available. Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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risk of extortionate demands, courts test exactions in terms of 
Nollan-Dolan due process: a challenged exaction must have a 
rational causal nexus to the public burdens caused by the 
permitted action, and the relationship between the exaction 
and the offset burden must be roughly proportional.180 
 
 Essential Nexus and Rough Proportionality are due 
process tests, not “regulatory takings” tests: Note that 
exactions must satisfy criteria that are essentially substantive 
due process, most relevantly the general prohibition against 
irrational government actions. The judicial review of exactions 
is sometimes mislabeled as “regulatory takings” review, as in 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District. For 
purposes of jurisprudential and functional clarity, however, it 
is important to distinguish the difference. Regulatory takings 
scrutiny focuses on tests of excessive property value 
diminution, as in Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central. 
Questions of authority, proper purpose, and rationality of 
government action sound in general due process. 
3. Remedy Semantics: 
 Remedies for regulatory excess for failure of general 
due process element(s): What remedies are in order when a 
government action is judicially determined to be 
unconstitutional? It significantly depends upon what kind of 
constitutional criterion was violated. If the court finds that the 
government action violated one or more of the general 
substantive due process criteria of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments—i.e., it is ultra vires, has an improper public 
purpose, is irrational in its design, etc.—then the action is void 
on its own terms. And, further, monetary damages may be 
awarded under the Civil Rights Act’s § 1983 if the action took 
place with intent or some form of gross negligence.181 
 
 180. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). One could also view unconstitutional 
exactions, if done for a proper public purpose, as asking the applicant landowner 
to assume an undue measure of a public burden, seemingly excessive because of 
its irrationality. Though the substantive due process analysis necessarily differs 
from that of regulatory takings, it has a similar effect from the landowner’s 
perspective. 
 181. See 1 SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: 
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 §3:45 (4th ed. 2017). 
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 Remedies for regulatory excess for invalid takings: If, 
on the other hand, the government action was found to be a 
constitutionally invalid, excessive regulatory taking as applied 
to the claimant’s property, typically the government agency has 
a choice. It can pay compensation for the particular diminution 
of value, waive the regulation as applied to the claimant, or 
accept an injunction against application of the regulation to the 
successful claimant’s property. In some cases, the courts can 
also award damages for a “temporary invalid taking,” 
compensating for the value of property loss during the time of 
unconstitutional constraint on the use and development of the 
regulated property.182 
E. Some Semantic Hygiene for the Koontz Case 
Applying semantic clarifications to the Koontz case 
demonstrates the simple and logical distinction between 
regulatory takings and due process exaction reviews, and it 
reveals some of the incongruities of the case. 
The Court majority in Koontz regarded the proposed off-
site monetary exactions as requiring Nollan-Dolan review.183 In 
remanding the case, however, the Court failed to distinguish 
between due process and takings clause protections. 
Justice Alito came frustratingly close to recognizing the 
difference between takings and due process: 
Even if [the agency] would have been entirely within its 
rights in denying the permit . . . , that greater authority 
does not imply a lesser power to condition permit approval 
on petitioner’s forfeiture of his constitutional rights. See 
Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836–837 (explaining that “[t]he evident 
constitutional propriety” of prohibiting a land use 
“disappears . . . if the condition substituted for the 
prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the 
 
 182. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 183. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 614 (2013). 
We base this analysis on the facts as the Supreme Court treated them, that is, 
from the stance that the validity of the off-site exactions were potentially 
determinative and that the at-issue parcel indeed was statutory wetlands, thus 
presenting normal wetland legal considerations. 
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justification for the prohibition”).184 
Justice Alito realized that if, as an initial step, the agency 
could have constitutionally denied the permit without violating 
the takings test, the further question was whether the 
condition satisfied the rationality requirement, and he cited the 
Nollan-Dolan test to make that determination.185 Further, 
Justice Alito still almost made the critical distinction: 
That is not to say, however, that there is no relevant 
difference between a consummated taking and the denial of 
a permit based on an unconstitutionally extortionate 
demand. Where the permit is denied and the condition is 
never imposed, nothing has been taken. While the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes that this 
burdens a constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment 
mandates a particular remedy—just compensation—only for 
takings.186 
Justice Alito here clearly said “nothing has been taken,” and 
that takings compensation is ordered “only for takings.” But 
having cited Nollan—which conflated “takings” with 
“substantially advanced” due process based on the Agins 
dictum rejected in Lingle eight years before Koontz—Alito then 
failed to say that “this thus is not a takings case.” Instead, he 
simply remanded, leaving it up to the Florida courts to 
determine whether “takings” jurisprudence (a concept 
conceived in federal rather than state jurisprudence) applied in 
this case: 
Florida law allows property owners to sue for “damages” 
whenever a state agency’s action is “an unreasonable 
exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking 
without just compensation.” Fla. Stat. Ann. §373.617. 
Whether that provision covers an unconstitutional 
conditions claim like the one at issue here is a question of 
state law. . . .187 
 
 184. Id. at 608. 
 185. Id. at 608–09. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 610 (emphasis added). The dissent, contrarily, saw this subsequent 
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On remand, the Florida courts never asked whether this 
was a taking or due process unconstitutional conditions issue, 
nor did they consider any of the ramifications of that 
distinction. Thus, since the Florida Fifth District appellate 
court had already affirmed the trial court’s application of 
Nollan-Dolan in an earlier judgment, it simply restated its 
prior holding, which had affirmed an earlier circuit court 
decision finding that the conditions failed Nollan-Dolan and 
effected a “taking.”188 Unfortunately, without considering 
Alito’s distinction or Lingle, the Florida state courts thus 
unthinkingly assumed that an exaction invalidated through 
Nollan-Dolan analysis automatically and categorically 
constituted an invalid “taking,” rather than making the 
distinction between Due Process and Takings Clause 
protections. This misunderstanding ultimately led to a judicial 
remedy order that was inconsistent with violations of either 
Due Process or the Takings Clause respectively. 
Justice Kagan penned a strong dissent to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s judgment, but the two opinions, the majority 
by Justice Alito and the dissent by Justice Kagan, actually 
appear to have more in common than they do in opposition.189 
First, both agreed that a straight-out denial of Mr. Koontz’s 
request to fill his three-and-a-half acres would not have 
involved Nollan-Dolan, but rather would merely present a 
straight takings question under the Penn Central takings 
test.190 Second, although both used the “takings” rubric, both 
agreed that Koontz presented a test of unconstitutional 
conditions and not a case where excessive regulatory 
 
analysis as only applicable if the exaction would, when viewed outside the 
permitting context, effect a taking under the physical appropriation taking test. 
Since, following Eastern Enterprises, they could not justify the monetary exactions 
as effecting this type of per se taking, the dissenters did not see applying Nollan-
Dolan as necessary or appropriate. Id. at 620–21 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 188. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 (Fla. App. 5th 
Dist. 2014). 
 189. The analysis here draws in part from analysis of a commentary from our 
recently departed colleague Marc Poirier of Seton Hall Law School in a response 
message contributed to a listserv debate on Koontz between Professor John 
Echeverria, the eminent takings scholar at Vermont Law School, and me. Posting 
of Marc Poirier, Professor of Law and Martha Traylor Research Scholar, Seton 
Hall Univ. School of Law, poirierma@shu.edu, to Envtl. Law Professors Listserv, 
envlawprofessors@lists.uoregon.edu (June 27, 2013) (on file with author). 
 190. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 607–08; id. at 632 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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diminution of private property value was claimed or proven.191 
Third, they both—and this is a critical semantic and 
analytical flaw—mixed the concept of unconstitutional 
conditions into the rubric of takings, either by mistake or by 
simply missing an opportunity for greater clarity, and thereby 
bollixed their reasoning. The Alito opinion, as previously noted, 
did state that the Koontz facts were not exactly a taking, but he 
then went on to say that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine made the case a constitutional matter, leaving open 
the question of what kind of constitutional test applies.192 
Justice Kagan’s dissent makes the Eastern Enterprises 
distinction, but in her opposition to any review of monetary 
exactions ultimately says that “by applying Nollan and Dolan 
to permit conditions requiring monetary payments . . . the 
majority extends the Takings Clause, with its notoriously 
‘difficult’ and ‘perplexing’ standards, into the very heart of local 
land-use regulation.”193 She neither states nor implies that 
unconstitutional conditions are a completely separate question 
from takings validity. 
And finally, both opinions also agreed—and this too raises 
problematic issues—that the unconstitutional conditions test 
should apply equally to permit denials where an applicant has 
refused proposed conditions as it does to scrutiny of permits 
that have actually been issued with attached conditions. Both 
opinions label, and equate, these as “conditions precedent and 
conditions subsequent.”194 In a case like Koontz, however, 
where the agency ultimately denies the property owner’s 
original request after a failure to agree on the terms for 
altering the existing rules, it is not at all clear how a court 
should weigh the unsuccessful proposed conditions. The 
proposals were inchoate, and a clear governmental demand 
was never applied.195 
 
 191. Id. at 604 (majority opinion); id. at 624–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 608–09 (majority opinion). 
 193. Id. at 626 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 194. Id. at 607; id. at 620 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 195. The essence of the “demand” distinction lies in the realities of negotiation. 
In virtually all negotiating sessions, the parties try out a variety, sometimes 
dozens, of alternative terms and options. Absent some sort of interlocutory 
request for a judicial declaratory judgment, we would argue that it is only when a 
governmental party defines a condition as a sine qua non mandatory requirement 
of permit issuance that there is sufficient ripeness, finality, and clarity of demand 
to support a judicial inquiry for unconstitutionality. If, as in Koontz, there is no 
 794 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
So in the aftermath of Koontz, there are several focal 
points of useful contested analysis, including the issues of: 
(1) Whether the Nollan-Dolan unconstitutional conditions 
inquiry appropriately applies to monetary exactions—we think 
the answer is yes; 
(2) Whether the Nollan-Dolan unconstitutional conditions 
inquiry appropriately applies to offsets, exactions, and other 
development conditions generally—we think the answer is yes; 
(3) If negotiating parties do not reach an agreement, and 
the various inchoate proposed offsetting conditions never 
become concrete enough to constitute a sufficient governmental 
“demand” to merit testing under Nollan-Dolan, then we think 
that the appropriateness of applying that test is quite doubtful; 
and 
(4) What remedy makes sense (a) if an issued permit 
required a condition that was later found to violate Nollan-
Dolan or (b) if a permit denial follows applicant rejection of 
demanded conditions? In the former, we think the exaction is 
struck and a severability analysis determines whether the 
remaining substance of the permit survives or fails. In the 
latter, we think Nollan-Dolan applies, and, if the required 
exaction fails, then it is inapplicable, and the permitting 
agency is free to do nothing, or to consider granting the permit 
with or without an alternative valid condition. 
Within each of these situations there lies the semantic 
challenge whether to utilize the terms of Nollan-Dolan analysis 
as a due process rationality review or to commingle it with the 
very different doctrinal twists and remedy consequences of 
takings law. We suggest that courts necessarily should choose 
the former, wiser avenue of judicial review. 
III. THREE USEFUL CLARIFYING PROPOSITIONS 
With a semantically cleansed understanding of the takings 
doctrine described above in mind, analysis of the Koontz 
decision prompts three propositions that should clarify these 
contested points of analysis and simplify judicial review of 
 
such finality, no single option required (plus an unrequited open invitation for the 
applicant to offer further suggestions, and no judicial consideration of the possible 
constitutionality of one or more of the agency’s proposed five options) we think the 
negotiation has not produced a reviewable governmental demand sufficient to 
justify the rigors of Nollan-Dolan scrutiny. 
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exaction challenges moving forward. First, exaction challenges 
involve two logically distinct tests for the constitutionality of 
the government action; second, the Nollan-Dolan formula of 
review is plenary and applies to all conditional government 
regulations; and third, the distinction between Due Process 
and Takings Clause protections guides remedy formulation for 
constitutionally invalid government actions. 
A. Regulatory Exaction Challenges Involve Two Logically 
Distinct Tests of the Constitutional Validity of the 
Governmental Actions . . . and the Distinction Is Not 
Rocket Science 
Assuming that the delegation of authority to an agency 
and the public purpose behind the permitting program it 
oversees do not themselves raise due process concerns, 
analytically, there are two separate targeted constitutional 
inquiries or two cognitive steps involved in cases like Koontz 
that involve scrutiny of land-use permit restrictions with 
exactions. 
In terms of logical staging in an exactions case, the first 
targeted inquiry goes to pure regulatory takings validity: could 
the permitting agency have denied the application outright? 
This addresses the fundamental question of whether the 
property-owner would suffer a diminution of property value 
that “goes too far,” i.e., is constitutionally excessive and 
constitutes an invalid expropriation, if denied the desired 
permit.196 If an agency must grant a permit as of right, then 
any required conditions or exactions placed on that permission 
would go too far and effect a regulatory taking. In Koontz, 
neither the Supreme Court majority nor the dissenters noted 
any evidence showing that the permit denial caused excessive 
property value diminution so as to effect an invalid regulatory 
taking as understood in Pennsylvania Coal or Penn Central.197 
Accordingly, the Koontz Court was not making or assuming any 
finding of excessive diminution, so it should have moved to the 
second inquiry. 
If then, as in Koontz, a government agency could 
constitutionally deny a permit but instead declares that it will 
 
 196. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 197. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 621–22 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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grant it with exaction conditions attached, then the quite-
different second targeted inquiry arises. The question here is 
not whether an exaction is an excessive diminution of property 
value, but rather whether the exaction rationally and 
proportionally addresses the potential harm it offsets.198 This is 
the Nollan-Dolan exactions inquiry—an “unconstitutional 
conditions” question grounded in general principles of 
substantive due process rationality review. The framework of 
that review depends on the character of the government action, 
i.e. the exaction. If, as in Nollan and Dolan, the government 
agency could not validly demand the exaction standing alone 
without compensation—meaning the demand would be a 
taking if not conditional—then the proportional nexus 
framework of review outlined in those cases, as opposed to an 
alternate standard of rationality review, applies.199 
B. After Koontz, We Conclude, the Nollan-Dolan Test Is 
Plenary for All Conditional Governmental 
Requirements, Including Monetary Exactions but—
Properly Understood—That Does Not Portend Chaos 
in Municipal Land Use Management 
The Koontz majority lumps unreasonable monetary 
exactions together with the questioned access easements from 
 
 198. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 199. See discussion infra Section III.B. In Koontz, both the majority and the 
dissenting opinions focused upon the character of the exactions, the second 
targeted inquiry. Both Court opinions seemed to support applying the two-step 
Nollan-Dolan inquiry—that sounds in due process—to review the 
constitutionality of required conditions, regardless of whether the permit was 
denied or granted. Neither opinion balked at the inchoate “merely proposed 
alternatives” nature of the conditions at play. Justice Kagan in dissent, however, 
argued that no specific exaction had ever been required, that an exaction 
requirement for funds rather than property accommodations could not effect a 
taking, and, accordingly, that the Koontz facts did not trigger rationality review 
under the Nollan-Dolan proportional nexus framework. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 620 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). The majority, contrarily, found that monetary demands 
could constitute a taking, so monetary exactions would invoke Nollan-Dolan’s 
proportional nexus framework of scrutiny, and further found that the existence of 
such monetary exactions—in Koontz for off-site proposals—even if never actually 
required, necessitated Nollan-Dolan review. Id. at 615 (majority opinion). Neither 
Justice Alito nor Justice Kagan use the term rationality review. We phrase it as 
such here to continue along our course of semantic hygiene. Justice Kagan, 
however, does refer to the Nollan-Dolan framework as a standard of 
constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 620 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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Nollan and Dolan.200 It applied such a broad (property-
protective) understanding of the phrase “takings” that Nollan-
Dolan proportional-nexus review would apply to most 
exactions—a seemingly radical concept. But understanding the 
Nollan-Dolan test as a formulation of substantive due process 
rationality review dulls these dire forecasts and actually makes 
it a rather inert statement. If Nollan-Dolan is a form of 
rationality review and if the due process clause requires 
rationality of all government action, then this merely sharpens 
the frame of an already necessary inquiry. If the action 
challenged is an exaction, then the terms “essential nexus” and 
“rough proportionality” frame the inevitable rationality review 
rather than the more ubiquitous general phrase “arbitrary and 
capricious.”201 
Local governments have required development fees to 
cover anticipated burdens on the community for decades, so 
monetary exactions are neither a new nor an exotic concept. In 
reviewing such development fees, a court would scrutinize 
whether the required monetary fees rationally relate to the real 
potential costs of the project, a due process analysis virtually 
identical to that of Nollan-Dolan review.202 
Applying this analysis more broadly will not bring 
governmental land use planning and implementation to its 
knees. Our colleague and an eminent takings scholar John 
 
 200. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 619 (majority opinion). 
 201. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. It is a simple matter of 
semantics. Some argue that this framing requires a tighter connection between 
the means and ends, but even assuming that as true, only the level of scrutiny 
changes, not the basis of the analysis, which mitigates what chaos the decision 
could portend. See Daniel Williams Russo, Protecting Property Rights with Strict 
Scrutiny: An Argument for the “Specifically and Uniquely Attributable” Standard, 
25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 575, 590–92 (1998). 
 202. As the eminent land-use professor J.B. Ruhl noted: 
[O]ne could look to the experience of states that already apply the state 
equivalent of Nollan-Dolan to impact fees. Decades ago, for example, the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled as a matter of state constitutional law that 
impact fees (and land exactions of course) must withstand a “dual 
rational nexus test” that is in all respects the same as Nollan-Dolan. 
Indeed, the land use authority must even show that the impact fees 
provide proportional benefits on a subdivision level basis . . . . I did not 
see any evidence that Florida’s rule led to increased permit denials . . . or 
that the burden on land use authorities was significant. 
Posting of J.B. Ruhl, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Univ., 
jb.ruhl@law.vanderbilt.edu, to Envtl. Law Professors Listserv, 
envlawprofessors@lists.uoregon.edu  (June 27, 2013) (on file with author). 
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Echeverria has expressed the conclusion that Koontz is the 
worst land use decision ever, threatening great ruin.203 But, 
the application of Nollan-Dolan is not an issue of strict 
scrutiny. If there is any increase in scrutiny from rational 
basis, it just requires competent land use planning and 
analysis to allow the agency to make the necessary minimal 
showing of rationality.204 With such planning, the challenger 
would still bear most of the burden of proof. 
Consider the five alternate conditions proposed in Koontz. 
If a reviewing court had subjected all of them to constitutional 
analysis, pretty clearly at least one would satisfy Nollan-
Dolan.205 Nollan-Dolan primarily addresses extortionate 
exactions, circumstances in which the governing agency 
withholds the permit-carrot to get something it wants in 
return. But a horse does not care about a dangled carrot if it 
has another readily available.206 Likewise, a permitting 
authority only needs to offer one viable option to satisfy due 
process.207 As the proceedings in Florida and the aerial satellite 
image of the region in Figure 2 indicate, the two off-site 
mitigation proposals were hydrologically connected to the 
Koontz parcel as part of the wetlands flowage of the 
 
 203. See Echeverria articles discussed supra note 19. 
 204. Viewing the levels of constitutional review as a spectrum and accounting 
for the burden shift called for in Dolan, the Nollan-Dolan nexus-rough 
proportionality requirement falls at the low end. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with a categorical approach to equal protection review, favoring a spectrum based 
on the social importance of the at-stake interests and the invidiousness of the 
governmental basis). It seems to fit somewhere between rational basis and 
intermediate scrutiny’s substantial relation requirement but far short of strict 
scrutiny’s necessary and least restrictive means requirements. This 
understanding places the scrutiny applied to exactions above that applied to 
economic regulations but below that applied to First Amendment review of 
facially neutral regulations and equal protection review of quasi-suspect classes. 
Justice Harry Blackmun’s notes from Nollan reveal that despite Justice Scalia’s 
use of the phrase “essential nexus” in the opinion, a majority of the justices were 
only looking for a “reasonable relationship.” Harry Blackmun, Associate Supreme 
Court Justice, Meeting Notes on Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n (Apr. 1, 1987) 
(available through the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in the 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 481). This suggests that Nollan-Dolan actually 
falls closer to rational basis than to intermediate scrutiny. 
 205. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2002 WL 
34724740, at *8 (Cir. Ct. Fla. Oct. 20, 2002) (applying only Nollan-Dolan to the 
off-site mitigation proposals without disclosing details of the analysis). 
 206. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 207. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 611 (2013). 
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Econlockhatchee watershed.208 Viewing the satellite imagery, 
the theory of the agency quite clearly is that the filling of 
wetlands and wetland recharge areas in the Econlockhatchee 
Watershed would cut down substantially on the natural 
watershed conditions and aquifer recharge, and repairing its 
tributaries would mitigate that.209 The Nollan relational nexus 
is obvious.210 The Dolan proportionality factor would require 
more specificity, but it seems demonstrable.211 Even if due 
process would invalidate both of these options, the agency 
presented Koontz with three other options. 
If permitting authorities develop their exaction proposals 
rationally and with a mind for the harm that they wish to 
offset, making Nollan-Dolan applicable to all exactions would 
only give property owners a slightly stronger hand during 
negotiations, meaning that agencies might need to increase 
their preparations to justify conditions that may seem 
excessive. This falls far short of strict scrutiny’s onerous 
burden.212 
Three further points push against the argument that the 
Nollan-Dolan framework will hinder normal land-use 
negotiations. First, a permittee must actually sue and risk the 
costs of litigation to make a full Nollan-Dolan showing 
immediately applicable. Second, any highly creative, 
disconnected conditions barred by Nollan-Dolan would not 
have survived substantive due process review under an 
alternative formulation had the permittee chosen to challenge 
it. Finally, if the Nollan-Dolan formulation did call for a 
somewhat higher level of scrutiny, while the knowledge thereof 
would inhibit permitting flexibility, it would also increase 
permitting predictability, increasing administrative efficiency 
in the majority of non-litigation proceedings and preserving 
resources for those proceedings in which the agency would have 
to litigate. The same reasons also urge against accepting the 
notion that making Nollan-Dolan plenary for exactions will 
dramatically increase the number of permit conditions 
 
 208. See discussion supra Section I.A, pp. 749–52. 
 209. See Figure 2. 
 210. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 211. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). It remains unclear 
whether the required proportionality is in terms of private burden and harm 
caused or ecological proportionality, i.e. wetland fill v. wetland mitigation. 
 212. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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contested in court. 
A bigger issue that could significantly shift the balance at 
the negotiation table arises, though, in the realm of choice of 
remedy, if reviewing courts award damages for conditions that 
fail Nollan-Dolan rather than simply invalidating them. 
C. The Distinction Between Takings and Due Process 
Issues Guides Remedy Formulations for 
Unconstitutional Government Regulations 
The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of remedy in 
Koontz, and the remand to the Florida courts affirmed the 2002 
trial court decision—which had found a “taking”—so they 
invalidated the conditions, ordered payment of the Florida 
statute’s “takings” damages, and ordered grant of the 
permit.213 Ordering grant of the permit corresponded with an 
updated understanding of the area’s hydrology that had 
emerged during the proceedings.214 Ordering damages for the 
exaction, however, stemmed from the fundamental conflation of 
substantive due process and takings. 
Due to the “takings” wording in the Supreme Court’s 
majority decision, the state court takings finding stayed in 
place, and its invocation of chapter 373, section 617(5) of the 
Florida Statutes, which requires compensation for any taking, 
remained valid.215 Applying that statute, the agency had to pay 
compensation to the property owner. Because Koontz received 
his permit, thus punctuating the “taking,” the trial court 
calculated damages via temporary takings.216 
Temporary takings compensation approximates lost rental 
value or implied revenue value for the time that a 
constitutionally invalid regulation causes an excessive property 
value diminution.217 But the off-site conditions in Koontz found 
 
 213. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So.3d 396, 398 (Fla. App. 5th 
Dist. 2014); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2002 WL 3472470, at *8 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002). 
 214. See discussion supra Section I.B, p. 757. 
 215. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2006 
WL 6912444, at *1–2 (Cir. Ct. Fla. Feb. 21, 2006); Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2004 WL 6072846, at *2 (Cir. Ct. Fla. May 26, 
2004). 
 216. See Koontz, 2006 WL 6912444, at *1–2; Koontz, 2004 WL 6072846, at *2. 
 217. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
 2018] SEMANTIC HYGIENE  801 
to violate Nollan-Dolan did not cause a diminution in property 
value. Instead, the trial court calculating damages attributed 
the delay caused by the mistake in hydrology to the off-site 
conditions and determined compensation based on that 
property and time period.218 
Rather than follow this incoherent route to assign takings 
compensation, the courts should have considered an invalid 
exaction as a matter of due process. The remedy for due process 
failings in a regulation are quite different from remedies for 
invalid takings—under either federal constitutional law or 
Florida state law.219 
When a regulatory action is determined to be 
unconstitutional for some basic substantive due process 
failures—ultra vires lack of sufficient delegated authority, lack 
of a proper public purpose, or lack of rationality—the usual 
remedy is nullification of the regulation on its face, not 
damages.220 When a facially constitutional regulatory action 
violates the constitution as applied, the usual remedy is 
nullification of the regulation as applied to the particular 
protesting party, again, not damages.221 
In contrast, when a court has determined that a regulation 
creates an unconstitutionally excessive burden as applied to a 
particular property, government usually has a choice—to pay 
compensation for the regulation’s continuance or nullify the 
 
 218. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 600 
(2013); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 77 So. 3d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 
2012); Koontz, 2006 WL 6912444, at *1–2; Koontz, 2003 WL 6072846, at *2; 
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 32, at 5; Affidavit of William Fogle, supra note 53 
and accompanying text. Basing a restriction on data that is later discovered to be 
inaccurate seems to raise another due process issue: governmental correction of 
the misapprehended regulatory action is required because of the ultra vires lack 
of pertinent authority. Where there is no allegation of intent or malice, though, 
there is a question of what remedy is appropriate for such due process violations. 
Would mere rescission be sufficient, or would this qualify as sufficient gross 
negligence to allow damages under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act? The latter 
seems unlikely. 
 219. Fenster, supra note 1, at 416 (noting that the substantive due process spin 
of Koontz may have future remedy implications). 
 220. See John F. Pries, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional 
Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2013) (saying that while courts generally 
will not award damages without congressionally created causes of action, it will 
award injunctive relief). 
 221. See Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 322, 
327 (2016) (advocating for a particular means of judicial restraint in awarding 
constitutional remedies). 
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regulation as applied to the property.222 In the latter case, 
there may also be temporary takings damages awarded for 
losses experienced before the regulation’s nullification.223 In 
Koontz, however, the fundamental finding of an 
unconstitutionally excessive takings burden was never 
involved. 
Considering the element of choice in takings remedies 
reveals the incongruity of viewing unconstitutional conditions 
as takings. Incorporating conditions into the adjudicative 
permitting process adds a transactional element, trading the 
condition for the permit. Focusing on the condition and giving 
the agency the choice to pay compensation or rescind their 
request would ignore the other half of the transaction. A due 
process decision to invalidate an extortionate measure as 
unconstitutional makes it a nullity. If the permit on its 
remaining terms is then deemed not to be severable, the permit 
is likewise nullified and the public-private parties can choose to 
go forward to negotiate a new arrangement, or not. 
Understanding a Nollan-Dolan invalidation as a violation of 
substantive due process thus clarifies the correct approach to 
defining a remedy in these exaction cases because it keeps a 
focus on the transactional nature of permitting with exactions.  
In Nollan and Dolan, given their judgment of the 
exactions’ irrationality in each case (and so hinted in Koontz), 
the respective courts each ordered an appropriate remedy—
invalidation of the condition—but they did so under the wrong 
title. Each court invalidated the condition as remedy for a 
taking rather than remedy for a violation of substantive due 
process.224 In Nollan and Dolan, this contributed to the ongoing 
confusion regarding constitutional review of exactions but had 
no direct impact on the involved parties.225 In Koontz, however, 
the circuit court deciding that the monetary exactions failed 
Nollan-Dolan had to derive some way to calculate damages 
because of the Florida statute meant to discourage 
uncompensated takings.226 
 
 222. See First English, 482 U.S. at 317–18. 
 223. See id. at 321. 
 224. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383, 94–96 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839, 841 (1987). 
 225. The Court in Nollan addressed just compensation indirectly by stating 
that the agency could acquire the conditioned property interests through separate 
eminent domain proceedings if it wishes. 483 U.S. at 841–42. 
 226. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.617(3) (West 2016). 
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The same statute also stipulates that the agency “shall 
agree to issue the permit.”227 Had one of the multiple reviewing 
courts identified Nollan-Dolan as a matter of substantive due 
process rather than takings, the judgment would not have 
invoked this statute. Nullification of the conditions alone would 
have proceeded as the logical remedy, and the matter would 
have returned to the agency to decide in its discretion whether 
to issue the permit or not. 
Federal law—§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also 
known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act”—makes damages available 
when certain official actors violate a person’s constitutional 
rights.228 For liability under § 1983, though, there must be a 
finding that the officials committed gross negligence in their 
actions or, even more strictly, acted toward the complainant in 
a manner that “grossly shocks the conscience.”229 In the Koontz 
case, it is extremely unlikely that the facts could meet such a 
standard of due process damages liability, particularly because 
Mr. Koontz himself had also assumed the mistaken “statutory 
wetlands” facts in his original permit application,230 so simple 
invalidation of the exaction would have been the appropriate 
remedy. 
The larger point is that the remedy determinations for 
exactions highlight a very significant difference between 
constitutional determinations of invalidity of regulatory 
takings and the due process invalidity of regulatory actions. 
The conflation muddle between takings and due process 
inquiries has critical consequences on this determination. 
Subsequent to identifying invalidation as the appropriate 
remedy for unconstitutional conditions, courts should also 
consider how that invalidation affects the remainder of the 
permit process. Thus far, however, courts have failed to 
consider this “severability” issue—whether the permit granted 
upon an exaction condition found to be unconstitutional would 
remain effective after invalidation of the condition, i.e., 
whether it is severable; or whether removal of the mandated 
but now-invalid condition voids the permit and either returns 
the parties to negotiations or ends the permitting process, i.e., 
it is not severable. 
 
 227. Id. § 373.617(3)(a). 
 228. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 229. See NAHMOD, supra note 181. 
 230. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 32, at 5 n.4. 
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In Nollan, the Commission had granted the permit, 
loosening its rules, because the homeowner initially agreed to 
transfer the access easement that the agency requested as a 
condition.231 The Supreme Court, while invalidating the 
condition, presumed severability without any reasoning and 
treated the permit as if it would nevertheless be fully valid 
without the quid pro quo.232 Similarly, in Dolan, the City had 
approved the landowner’s permit application only with exaction 
conditions based on the City’s community development code, 
denying the landowner’s application for a variance waiver of 
the code conditions.233 The Court reversed this decision but 
presumed the persistence of the permit approval without any 
severability discussion, and Ms. Dolan proceeded to build her 
mall without conditions.234 
Severability analysis by a court is normally supposed to 
turn upon a determination of the original intent of the 
promulgating agency,235 and in both Nollan and Dolan, the 
agency may well have considered the conditions as material to 
grant of the permit: with the exactions as quid pro quo, the 
agencies would grant the permits; without the exactions, they 
would not. However, both Justices Scalia and Rehnquist 
respectively, ignored the severability doctrine and presumed 
that the permits were fully valid despite the nullification of the 
agencies’ antecedent conditions. The Court allowed the 
developers to proceed with no conditions.236 Under normal 
severability doctrine, when the intent of the agency was not 
clear, the question of a remnant permit’s surviving terms 
should have been remanded. 
In a Koontz-type scenario, where the landowner refuses 
 
 231. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
 232. Id. at 841–42. The Nollans had already completed their larger house at 
this point, so concerns for economic waste may have counseled against considering 
severability and allowing the Commission to revoke the permit. See id. at 830. 
 233. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380–82 (1994). 
 234. Id. at 394–96. 
 235. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685–86 (1987) (noting that 
the absence of a severability clause raises no presumption for or against 
severability, with the relevant judicial inquiry instead being the intent of the 
drafters). 
 236. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394–96; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841–42. Note that if an 
agency presciently words its permit decision—“NO approval UNLESS these 
conditions are supplied,” instead of “YES, IF these conditions are supplied . . .”—
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proposed conditions, and then challenges the resultant permit 
denial, the reviewing court should review the proposed 
conditions, striking any condition determined to violate Nollan-
Dolan as a matter of substantive due process, and then remand 
the matter to the agency. 
CONCLUSION 
This article’s protracted analysis has been triggered by a 
frustrating semantic confusion deeply lurking within one of the 
most confusing areas of constitutional adjudication and 
democratic governance: how to draw the line between private 
property rights and collective public welfare protections. It took 
133 years for the Court, in a mystifyingly enigmatic decision, to 
say that private property could be unconstitutionally taken by 
regulations without, as the Framers had been thinking, being 
physically taken.237 Then, for another half century, the Court 
largely avoided trying to refine regulatory takings limits,238 
leaving lower courts to try erratically to assess property value 
diminution and find the line that marks “too far.” Due process, 
on the other hand, enjoyed substantial development in the 
Court during these years. Then, beginning in the 1970s, the 
law of regulatory takings re-emerged in Supreme Court case 
law, somewhat clarified, but also further confused.239 A major 
anti-regulatory movement swelling in national politics240 and a 
misconceived phrasing in a short-lived California case241 
brought on a volley of anti-regulatory judicial initiatives242 and 
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a semantic bastardization of judicial tests of regulatory validity 
that conflated the rationality review of permit conditions in the 
canonic Nollan-Dolan test with the excessive-diminution 
review of regulatory takings. A 2005 case243 should have put an 
end to this conflation, but it did not, and judicial understanding 
of the public-private duality continued in a semantic jumble. 
The 2013 Koontz case was as messy on its facts as it was 
legally in both its majority and dissenting opinions in the U.S. 
Supreme Court and in each of its Florida state court iterations. 
The case was actually solely concerned with the due process 
rationality of suggested supplementary conditions, but it was 
adjudicated in semantic terms as if it was an excessive-
diminution takings challenge. 
The muddle of concepts in Koontz serves in excellent 
fashion to illustrate the semantic dysfunctions of current 
judicial review of conditions applied contextually in 
government regulation of private actions. Building upon our 
autopsy of the judicial opinions in Koontz and the conclusions 
we draw therefrom, we propose a number of semantic hygiene 
clarifications—identifying what judicial tests are appropriate, 
distinguishing takings inquiries from due process rationality 
inquiries, and noting the different consequences that follow as 
to burden of proof, degree of scrutiny, and perhaps most 
significantly, distinguishing the very different remedies that 
should apply. 
If logic and words are applied carefully, it becomes clear 
that judicial reviews of regulatory exactions involve several 
separate stages. First, since exactions are raised in the context 
of an agency’s grant or denial of a permit, as with all 
government actions there’s an initial assessment confirming 
that the government actor possessed proper authority, a valid 
public purpose, and a rational basis for its permitting action. 
Then there’s the takings question, whether the agency action 
could validly deny the permit without excessively diminishing 
private property rights; if the permit could not validly be 
denied, no requirement of exaction conditions can be justified. 
Then finally, if an agency agrees to approve a permit—if 
particular exaction conditions are included—a permit that it 
could validly deny, then there’s the very different question 
whether the proposed conditions pass the Nollan-Dolan test. 
 
 243. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. 
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This last stage inquiry is not strict scrutiny but rather a very 
specific due process rationality nexus test: “Is the required 
condition causally and proportionately related to a need 
created by the permitted action?” This last stage is a targeted 
due process unconstitutional conditions inquiry, far different 
from the logic of takings jurisprudence despite the muddling 
imprecisions that too often entangle the semantics and logic of 
these cases. 
Judicial reviews of the constitutionality of government 
actions that affect individual and corporate property—
addressing the fragile balance between individual freedoms 
and a society’s collective imperatives, a core question of modern 
democratic governance—will be far simpler, clearer, 
predictable, satisfactory, and wiser, we submit, if they evolve, 
along the lines that we and our proposed lexicon here suggest, 
to integrate a far more careful definitional logic, and semantic 
hygiene.  
 
